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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Three Essays in Accounting Regulation and Debt Contract Characteristics 
by 
Bryan S. Graden 
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015 
Professor Richard Frankel, Chair 
 This dissertation is comprised of three essays relating to accounting regulation and debt 
contracting. The first essay is designed to draw inferences about lenders’ demand for lease 
accounting rules in light of proposed lease accounting standard changes. I study changes in 
lease-related debt covenants surrounding the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards 13: Accounting for Leases in 1976. I find that lenders are significantly less likely to 
inhibit leasing activity via lease restrictions after SFAS 13 adoption and that lenders are 
significantly more likely to modify debt covenants to capitalize operating leases across time in 
the post-SFAS 13-adoption period. The findings suggest that lenders adapt debt covenant 
definitions to changes in accounting standards. Further, the findings indicate that lenders adapt 
debt covenant definitions to changes in borrowers’ financial reporting incentives.  
 The second essay investigates whether lenders capitalize operating leases uniformly when 
defining debt covenants. I argue that bankruptcy treatment of leases affects lenders’ incentives to 
incorporate operating leases into debt covenants leading to differential treatment of operating 
leases as opposed to a “one-size-fits-all” contracting treatment of operating leases. Using a hand-
collected sample of lending agreements from firms that use operating leases extensively, I find a 
positive association between the probability of lenders capitalizing operating leases into debt 
xi 
 
covenants and the duration of borrowers’ lease contracts. The results indicate that lenders 
discriminate among operating leases when designing debt covenants and suggest that operating 
leases vary in their effect on credit risk. 
 The third essay examines the relation between contract-specified accounting standards 
and private lender country of domicile. Prior studies provide evidence suggesting that equity 
investors’ information gathering and processing costs are related to differences in reported 
accounting standards. While lenders have access to private information about prospective 
borrowers, I document that US lenders are more likely to contract on US accounting standards 
that match their home country. These findings generalize to Canadian, UK, and IFRS-country 
lenders and suggest that lenders exhibit a preference for home-country GAAP. In additional 
tests, I examine whether the degree of difference between borrower- and lender-country 
accounting standards affects the likelihood that a debt contract from a US lender specifies US 
GAAP and whether contracting on similar GAAP affects other loan terms. I find no significant 
effect on the probability of contracting on US GAAP when accounting differences are larger. 
Similarly, I find no significant evidence that lenders modify loan spread, maturity, and financial 
covenant use for loans from US lenders that specify US accounting standards. 
  
xii 
 
PREFACE 
 This dissertation is comprised of three essays relating to accounting regulation and debt 
contract characteristics. The general theme centers on how lenders are affected by accounting 
rules as applied by the borrower. While the three essays address different research questions, the 
common theme among them is how accounting rules affect lenders’ contracting choices. The 
purpose is to make inferences about lenders’ demand for accounting rules and how accounting 
rules affect lenders’ costs of contracting.  
 The first two essays consider how banks’ contracting incentives are affected by changes 
in lease accounting rules and the characteristics of off-balance-sheet leases. These essays provide 
evidence about how lenders change their use of debt covenants related to leases with the hope of 
informing standard setters about the nature of lenders’ demand for contractible measures related 
to leases (i.e., measures lenders can use to incorporate leases into debt covenants). Investigating 
lease accounting regulation and debt covenants is an important issue for several reasons. First, 
lenders care about leases because leases increase firm leverage which increases potential 
bankruptcy costs for lenders. Second, prior literature considers how off-balance-sheet or 
operating leases are associated with credit ratings and loan spreads but is relatively silent 
regarding debt covenants. Debt covenants are a critical aspect of a lending agreement as a 
monitoring mechanism providing for the transfer of control rights (see, e.g., Tirole 2006; Chava 
and Roberts 2008). Third, the Financial Accounting Standards Board released proposed 
modifications to current lease accounting rules that capitalize nearly all leases and prior research 
provides evidence that equity investors capitalize operating leases. However, recent evidence 
documents that lenders account for off-balance-sheet leases when pricing loans and do so 
selectively (Altamuro, Johnson, Pandit, and Zhang 2014). Given that debt covenants play an 
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important role in contracting for leases, the first two essays provide evidence regarding whether 
lenders change covenant definitions after adopting Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
13: Accounting for Leases and whether lenders change covenant definitions according to off-
balance-sheet lease characteristics. The purpose is to make inferences regarding lenders’ demand 
for accounting rules, whether price protection alone is sufficient to protect lenders in the 
contracting process, and to determine whether lenders discriminate among operating leases when 
defining debt covenants. 
 The final essay addresses accounting regulation in a cross-country setting. Given a global 
economy where each country has its own accounting standard-setting body, I investigate whether 
the existence of differing accounting standards across countries affects what standards a loan 
agreement uses for assessing covenant compliance. Prior research suggests that accounting 
standard differences are a source of costs to equity investors in making cross-border investment 
decisions (see e.g., Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller 2004; Covrig, Defond, and Hung 2007; and 
Yu and Wahid 2014). However, little evidence exists about whether accounting-standard 
differences affect debt-market participants. I argue that “translating” or mapping from one set of 
accounting standards to another is costly to lenders and provides incentive for them to contract 
on accounting standards (to be used for assessing covenant compliance) that coincide with 
accounting standards prevalent in lenders’ country of domicile. Studying contract-specified 
accounting standards provides empirical evidence related to the costs lenders face when 
contracting in an environment with multiple accounting standards, and the findings provide 
evidence about how differences in accounting standards affects lenders’ costs of contracting. 
Together, these essays provide evidence regarding lenders’ demand for accounting rules and how 
accounting rules affect lenders’ costs of contracting.
[1] 
 
Chapter 1: Lease Accounting Rule Changes 
and Debt Covenant Characteristics 
1.1 Introduction 
 Financial statement users have long claimed that current financial reporting for leases lacks 
transparency and provides insufficient disclosure (e.g., McGregor 1996). Beginning in 2009, the 
FASB undertook the project of revamping Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 13: 
Accounting for Leases (SFAS 13 or ASC 840) with the objective of providing “enhanced 
disclosures [and] greater transparency of a lessee‘s financial leverage.”1 This paper explores how 
banks incorporate financial reporting for leases into debt contracts. I study whether lease 
accounting rules produce numbers that are used in debt covenants and whether contracting parties 
adjust these numbers. My motivation is to infer the nature of lenders’ and borrowers’ demand for 
lease accounting rules. 
 Lenders have incentive to monitor leasing activity.  First, contractual lease payments 
increase the credit risk of the borrower. Leases have the potential to dilute lenders’ claims and may 
serve as a source of financing of risky investments, both of which decrease the value of lenders’ 
debt (Tirole 2006). Second, while lenders have many contracting mechanisms at their disposal to 
mitigate the impact of leasing activity on debt value including interest rates, debt covenants play 
a particularly important role in the context of leases. Because interest rates protect only against 
expected expropriation of value from debt to equity holders, the monitoring role of covenants and 
the ability of lenders to transfer control rights protects lenders against unexpected changes in 
                                                 
1 FASB: “Proposed Accounting Standards Updated (Revised): Leases (Topic 842), May 16, 2013. 
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borrower leases that may be associated with destruction of firm value (e.g., Tirole 2006 and Chava 
and Roberts 2008).  
 Although lenders have reason to monitor borrower leases via covenants, the extent to which 
lenders use accounting rules to define debt covenants is unclear. On one hand, prior research 
documents that lenders use generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as a starting point 
for writing covenants (Leftwich 1983). For example, if a borrower enters into a leasing 
arrangement that has characteristics of a debt-financed asset purchase such as a bargain purchase 
option, the lender can write a debt covenant to capture the effect of the lease on borrower credit 
risk by using GAAP-based long-term debt measures reported on the borrower’s balance sheet 
because GAAP requires recognition of leases with bargain purchase options. On the other hand, 
research provides contract-level evidence that lenders use modified measurement rules to 
systematically exclude certain accruals from covenant definitions (Li 2010; Li 2012). In the case 
of leases, if a borrower enters into a leasing arrangement that is a debt-financed asset purchase in 
substance but which falls outside the balance-sheet recognition requirements of GAAP, then the 
lender must write a debt covenant based on alternative measurement rules to adequately restrict 
borrower leasing activity.  
 To investigate lenders’ demand for lease accounting rules, I examine how debt covenants 
relating to leases change after borrowers adopt SFAS 13. Prior to SFAS 13, financial reporting for 
leases was limited to rental expense on the income statement and disclosures regarding future 
minimum lease payments for capital and operating leases. The most prevalent form of lease 
covenants came in the form of restrictions of annual rental payments. I argue that lease restrictions 
impose costs on the borrower in terms of funding capital investments. Because a lease restriction 
explicitly limits the level of lease payments, the borrower loses access to capital projects that 
[3] 
 
require lease financing if the lease restriction is binding and must forego the otherwise profitable 
investment opportunity. Subsequent to SFAS 13, firms report capital leases on the balance sheet 
and operating leases in the footnotes. With the advent of capital lease liabilities, lenders can 
contract directly on GAAP to monitor borrower leasing activity. If capital leases adequately 
capture lease-related credit risk, GAAP-based covenants (e.g., debt-equity ratios) will sufficiently 
monitor borrower leasing risk and reduce contracting costs to the borrower by providing greater 
financing flexibility for investment projects. Thus, I expect that lenders are less likely to continue 
using lease restrictions and equally or more likely to use GAAP-based covenants after SFAS 13 
adoption. 
 Using a hand-collected sample of lending agreements written before and after SFAS 13 
adoption, I find that lenders are significantly less likely to include lease restrictions after borrowers 
adopt SFAS 13. At the same time, I document that lenders heavily use debt-equity covenants based 
exclusively on GAAP in both the pre- and post-SFAS 13 adoption periods. Multivariate analyses 
indicate no significant change in the probability of including GAAP-based debt-equity covenants 
after SFAS 13 adoption. Given that pre-SFAS 13 GAAP does not capitalize leases and post-SFAS 
13 GAAP recognizes capital leases on the balance sheet, the results suggest that after SFAS 13 
adoption lenders contract on balance sheet accounting measures for leasing activity in lieu of 
tailored lease restrictions.  
 I also investigate lenders’ response to SFAS 13 financial reporting rules in the post-
adoption period. I document an increase in the ratio of rental expense to capital lease liability over 
time for the universe of Compustat firms indicating a more pronounced role for operating leases 
relative to capital leases. I find that debt contracts are more likely to contain covenants that 
capitalize operating leases across time during post-adoption years, which contrasts with prior 
[4] 
 
evidence from lending contracts that lenders appear to ignore operating leases in debt covenants 
(El-Gazzar 1993). Taken together, the findings suggest that lenders are sensitive to lease 
accounting rules and react to standard changes that affect balance-sheet recognition of leases. 
Further, lenders appear to adapt to shifts in the nature of lease transactions as borrowers entered 
into more operating leases relative to capital leases as a form of financing. 
 While the results of this study hold after controlling for a rich set of borrower and loan 
characteristics, loans with multiple lease-related covenants, and alternative estimation techniques, 
the findings are subject to caveats. First, the sample may exhibit selection bias. Given the difficulty 
of obtaining debt contracts surrounding SFAS 13 adoption, I employ a number of sample selection 
criteria to identify firms affected by SFAS 13. To the extent that I capture only those firms that 
were unable to renegotiate lease contracts to avoid capital leases, the sample firms may differ from 
other firms in ways unobservable to the researcher, which limits the generalizability of my 
findings. Second, the small sample inhibits my ability to include additional controls such as firm 
and time fixed effects that could account for unobservable firm-specific characteristics and events 
such as the consolidation of banks that occurred after banking deregulation during the sample 
period. To the extent that the models do not incorporate firm- and time-specific effects that are 
correlated with the likelihood of using lease covenants, the models may be misspecified. Finally, 
the composition of firms in the sample does not enable me to perform within-firm analysis of 
covenant changes.2 The change in covenants from the pre to the post-SFAS 13 period may compare 
firms with different characteristics. While I control for a number of firm-level observables, the pre 
                                                 
2 The sample contains only eight firms with contracts before and after SFAS 13 adoption (16 contracts), which limits 
my ability to estimate within-firm regressions.  
[5] 
 
and post firms may differ in unobservable ways that limit my ability to make valid comparisons 
of covenant changes across the accounting standard change. 
 This study contributes to both accounting standard setting and extant debt-contracting 
research. First, this study is relevant to the ongoing debate surrounding the current and proposed 
lease accounting standards. SFAS 13 accounting rules introduced balance-sheet recognition of 
capital leases according to bright-line criteria relating to lease characteristics. The results of this 
study indicate that lenders changed the nature of lease-related debt covenants from restrictive 
covenants to covenants incorporating capital leases. The recent Exposure Drafts (ED) intensify the 
SFAS 13 recognition and disclosure requirements for leases proposing balance-sheet recognition 
of all lease contracts with terms greater than 12 months. I expect this study to inform the standard-
setting process by providing evidence of lenders’ demand for balance-sheet measures of leasing 
activity.  
 Second, I document contrasting findings to extant research examining changes in debt 
contract characteristics in response to changes in accounting rules. Prior studies find that mandated 
accounting changes diminish the contractibility of GAAP. Frankel, Seethamraju, and Zach (2008) 
study whether lenders include GAAP goodwill in net worth covenants and find that lenders are 
more likely to exclude goodwill from net worth covenants after the FASB issued SFAS 141 and 
SFAS 142 relating to business combination and goodwill accounting. Ball, Li, and Shivakumar 
(2013) find a significant decline in both the frequency and probability of using financial covenants 
after mandatory IFRS adoption. The authors also provide evidence that lenders substitute financial 
covenants with non-financial covenants.3 My results differ from previous studies in that I 
                                                 
3 As part of their analyses, Ball et al. (2013) hand collect a sample of lending agreements. They note that the hand-
collected sample contains no covenant modifications to exclude the effects of fair value accounting.  
[6] 
 
document that lenders’ initial response to SFAS 13 adoption is to use capital lease liability on the 
balance sheet while discontinuing the use of lease restrictions. The findings suggest that SFAS 13 
produces measures that correlate with debt value enhancing the contractibility of GAAP for leases. 
Further tests indicate that this enhancing effect dissipates across time consistent with the leasing 
industry adapting to altered incentives to structure lease transactions to achieve off-balance-sheet 
lease classification.4  
 Third, I contribute to extant research investigating how debt-market participants make 
adjustments for leasing activity. Prior empirical studies document significant associations between 
operating leases and credit ratings and loan spreads (e.g., Lim, Mann, and Mihov 2003; Batta, 
Ganguly, and Rosett 2012; Kraft 2012; Altamuro et al. 2013). These findings indicate that lenders 
account for borrower expropriations relating to leases in expectation when pricing debt 
agreements. My findings differ from prior literature by documenting that lenders change debt 
covenant definitions in response to innovations in accounting rules upon which the covenants are 
based. Importantly, the findings emphasize the role of debt covenants, separate from price 
protection, to mitigate unexpected borrower actions that decrease the value of debt to lenders.5 
 Fourth, the findings of this study complement a growing literature relating to debt contract 
design. Early studies based on legal handbooks of best contracting practices provide evidence that 
public bondholders tailor accounting rules to define financial covenants (Leftwich 1983). More 
recent studies document an association between income-statement based financial covenants and 
                                                 
4 The setting of lease accounting rule changes is well suited to answering questions related to debt contracting for 
two reasons. First, lease accounting is an alternative means of financing (relative to debt financing) and may be 
significant to a borrower’s capital structure (Eisfeldt and Rampini 2009). Second, because the SFAS 13 bright-line 
rules allow for transaction structuring, it is difficult to assert without empirical evidence that SFAS 13 properly 
partitions between economic liabilities and rentals in a way that is informative to lenders about borrower credit risk. 
5 Lenders face limits on their ability to price protect through interest rates. As interest rates become too high, lenders 
attract borrowers of decreasing credit quality. If borrower credit quality is too poor, lenders will ration credit (Tirole 
2006). 
[7] 
 
increased application of fair value accounting (e.g., Li 2010; Demerjian 2011; Li 2012). These 
studies provide evidence consistent with fair value adjustments and transitory accruals diminishing 
the value of GAAP for debt contracting. My study provides evidence that lenders design contracts 
that incorporate borrower leases into debt covenants. It is the first study to empirically document 
the specific covenants lenders use to monitor leasing activity and documents how those covenants 
changed around the adoption of lease accounting standards. 
 Finally, this study relates to prior work on the consequences of SFAS 13. Imhoff and 
Thomas (1988) argue that lessees had incentive to renegotiate lease contracts to avoid debt 
covenant violations due to capital leases being recognized on the balance sheet. The study 
documents a negative relation between pre-SFAS 13 footnoted capital lease levels and changes 
in capitalized leases during the transition years prior to adopting SFAS 13. The authors posit that 
the findings are indicative of lessees substituting from capital leases to operating leases. 
Extending the authors’ findings, I document that in years following SFAS 13 adoption, the 
probability that lenders use debt covenants that capitalize operating leases increases across time 
suggesting that the nature of operating leases changed across the sample period. This result is 
consistent with arguments that SFAS 13 bright-line rules engender transaction structuring 
blurring the distinction between capital and operating leases (McGregor 1996). 
1.2  Background and Hypothesis Development 
1.2.1  The Role of Debt Covenants 
 Debt covenants provide a mechanism unique from price protection to preserve debt value. 
Tirole (2006) notes that the potential for loss of debt value is not sufficient to justify the existence 
of covenants. Price protection anticipates borrower actions that diminish the value of debt by 
shifting firm value away from debtholders to shareholders (i.e., changing the allocation of the 
[8] 
 
corporate pie among claimants on firms assets) or by destroying firm value (i.e., decreasing the 
size of the pie). However, the price of debt is effective in expectation. The principal justification 
for covenants is to mitigate unexpected decreases in debt value (Tirole 2006; Chava and Roberts 
2008). Covenants protect debt value in two ways. First, covenants explicitly restrict actions that 
expropriate wealth from debtholders. Common restrictions include limitations on dividend 
payments and capital expenditures (Smith and Warner 1979). In the context of this study, lenders 
restrict leases by limiting the amount of aggregate lease payments made by the borrower (i.e., lease 
restrictions). Second, covenants enable lenders to exert influence on corporate decisions. Lenders’ 
influence comes in the form of bargaining power when borrowers violate covenants such as 
financial ratios. Prior research supports the “transfer of control rights” role of debt covenants by 
documenting changes in corporate behavior including investments and accounting choices 
following covenant violations (e.g., Chava and Roberts 2008; Nini, Smith, and Sufi 2012; Tan 
2013).  
 Important to this study, covenants assist lenders in monitoring leasing activity. Lenders’ 
concern for leases stems from the effects of leasing on debt value. Contractual lease payments 
increase the operating leverage of the borrower and dilute lenders’ claims to firm assets. Leases 
may also serve as the financing vehicle of risky investments. These possibilities threaten the 
value of lenders’ debt and justify the use of covenants (Tirole 2006).    
1.2.2  The Evolution of Lease Accounting Standards 
Prior to the promulgation of SFAS 13, firms followed guidance from Accounting Principles 
Board Opinion No. 5: Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lessee (APB 5), which was 
issued in 1964. Under APB 5, firms were required to book rental expense on the income statement 
for lease payments and disclose future rental amounts in the footnotes (Accounting Principles 
[9] 
 
Board 1964). In 1973, the SEC issued Accounting Standards Release 147 requiring separate 
footnote disclosures for “financing leases” defined as noncancelable leases with either a lease term 
greater than or equal to 75 percent of the leased asset useful life or a provision guaranteeing the 
fair market value of the leased asset (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 1973). In 1976 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) promulgated Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards 13: Accounting for Leases (SFAS 13). This standard provides guidance on 
recognition and disclosure of leases based on four criteria of lease contracts:  
1) the lease contract contains a bargain purchase option,  
2) the lease contract contains a provision for transfer of ownership at the end of the lease 
term,  
3) the present value of future lease payments is greater than or equal to 90 percent of the 
fair market value of the leased asset,  
4) the lease term is greater than or equal to 75 percent of the useful life of the leased asset.  
Leases meeting any one of these criteria require balance-sheet entries to report a lease asset 
and lease liability and income statement entries to amortize the lease asset and book interest 
expense for the lease liability. All other lease contracts are categorized as operating leases. 
Operating leases require no balance-sheet recognition of a lease asset or liability. Lease payments 
are expensed on a straight-line basis (rather than expensed as incurred) regardless of rental 
escalators or other fluctuations in payments, and lessees provide only footnote disclosures of future 
minimum lease payments. SFAS 13 stipulated that firms apply the new standard retroactively 
which entailed applying SFAS 13 rules to all existing leases and presenting a comparative balance 
sheet showing what the capital lease liability would have been had SFAS 13 been in effect in the 
fiscal year prior to adoption. Given concerns regarding costs of implementation including covenant 
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violation, the FASB initially allowed for a five-year transition period. However, the SEC reduced 
this period to two years. Thus, for fiscal years ending after 1979, firms were required to comply 
with SFAS 13 (Securities and Exchange Commission 1977). 
 Firms’ use of operating leases grew substantially across time with ongoing debate 
regarding potential deficiencies of the standard (McGregor 1996). Over thirty years after the 
release of the original standard, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) released a 
statement of Preliminary Views in 2009 followed by two Exposure Drafts (ED) in August 2010 
and May 2013 that outline proposed changes to lease accounting. The ED proposes a “right-of-
use” model taking the perspective that leases are a stream of payments in exchange for the right 
to use an asset or property. The ED proposes capitalizing all leases with lease terms exceeding 
12 months. Lessees recognize separate right-of-use assets and associated lease liabilities 
representing the financing of the assets. In subsequent periods after initial measurement, lessees 
record income statement entries by amortizing the right-of-use asset on a straight-line basis and 
recognizing interest expense on the lease liability (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2013). 
1.2.3  Hypotheses 
 Using covenants involves a trade-off between type I and type II errors. On one hand, parties 
prefer covenants that facilitate the timely transfer of control rights to prevent borrower actions 
such as overinvestment that transfer wealth from the lender (type II errors). On the other hand, 
covenants may lead to lender opportunism if states where the borrower is not in financial distress 
trigger a violation and transfer control rights to the lender (type I errors). Costs of writing 
covenants may occur ex ante in the drafting phase of writing a contract and include negotiating if 
and how many covenants to include, how the covenants are calculated, how tightly the covenants 
are set, and how frequently covenant compliance assessments occur. Ex post, costs include 
[11] 
 
monitoring covenant compliance and a decrease in total wealth as a result of constraining borrower 
activities that transfer wealth from lenders (Smith and Warner 1979).6 Lenders define covenants 
based strictly on GAAP or based on negotiated measurement rules which use GAAP as a basis and 
then make non-GAAP adjustments (Li 2010). Leftwich (1983) argues that the costs and benefits 
of contracting can be inferred from observation:  
“[T]here is a paucity of evidence of the costs and benefits of alternative accounting rules. 
The sources of some of those costs and benefits can be inferred by examining measurement 
rules that are endorsed, modified, or rejected in private contracts…[I]f users 
systematically reject or modify rules with particular properties (e.g., rules allowing 
upward revaluation of assets), we can infer that those rules are not cost-justified for that 
group of users.”  
Thus, observing how lenders change debt covenants in response to the advent of SFAS 13 
measures of lease liability provides an indication of lenders’ demand for contractible measures of 
leasing activity. 
 Figure 1 shows changes in the financial reporting treatment of lease contracts and how 
lenders’ menu of available covenant choices changed across accounting rule regimes. Prior to 
SFAS 13, APB 5 and ASR 147 provided financial reporting guidance for leases, and the vast 
majority of leases were kept off the balance sheet and appeared only as rental expense on the 
income statement. To capture any effect of leasing activity on operating leverage, lenders either 
restricted leasing activity directly, where lease restrictions are dollar thresholds limiting the 
borrower’s annual lease payments, or used a non-GAAP covenant adjustment to capitalize lease 
                                                 
6 Lenders have incentive to restrict borrower activity that increases total wealth (e.g., adopting risky, positive NPV 
investments) because few of the benefits accrue to the lender. 
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rental expense. The balance sheet did not report a liability associated with a firm’s leases—debt 
covenants defined using GAAP liabilities such as debt-to-equity ratios would not capture changes 
in borrower leases. However, lenders still placed constraints on leasing activity via lease 
restrictions or capitalizing rental expense.  
 Subsequent to SFAS 13 adoption, firms record a capital lease liability (and associated lease 
asset) for lease contracts meeting one of the four criteria noted above.  I argue that, relative to 
covenants based on capital lease liability, lease restrictions impose net costs on the borrower. 
Because a lease restriction explicitly limits a borrower’s lease payments, the borrower loses access 
to capital projects that require lease financing if the lease restriction is binding. Thus, the borrower 
must forego a profitable investment opportunity because of the lease restriction. To the extent that 
the capital lease liability adequately informs lenders about changes in debt value associated with 
leasing activity, using the GAAP-based covenants rather than lease restrictions mitigates capital 
investment opportunity costs (to the borrower):  
H1: Lenders are less likely to use lease restrictions in debt contracts after borrowers adopt 
SFAS 13. 
H2: Lenders are more likely to base debt covenants on balance-sheet measures of capital lease 
liability after borrowers adopt SFAS 13.  
 While I predict that lenders likely discontinue using lease restrictions in the post-adoption 
period, it is not a foregone conclusion that capital lease liabilities continue to provide a contractible 
measure correlated with debt value in the post-adoption period. Imhoff and Thomas (1988) argue 
that contracting incentives such as avoiding covenant violations led firms to renegotiate lease 
contracts prior to adopting SFAS 13. They measure the change in capital leases during the 
transition period and document that firms with greater pre-adoption capital leases have a larger 
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decrease in capital leases relative to the pre-adoption and post-adoption periods. If firms substitute 
away from capital to operating leases, then the capital lease liability becomes less reflective of 
firms’ lease contracting choices. More importantly, if firms structure leasing arrangements to keep 
leases off balance sheet, the underlying economics of leasing arrangements become further blurred 
and the capital lease liability no longer captures the effect of leasing activity on debt value. 
Moreover, the use of operating leases to side-step bright-line thresholds became an increasingly 
common practice among corporations after the passage of SFAS 13 (Imhoff Jr., Lipe, and Wright 
1991). I predict that lenders have incentive to capitalize operating leases in response to lessee 
incentives to engage in operating leases: 
H3: The probability of capitalizing operating leases in debt covenants increases across time 
in the post-SFAS 13 adoption period. 
1.3  Research Design 
 To test the first two hypotheses regarding the choice of lease-related covenants (H1 and 
H2), I employ the following model: 
 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑁𝑇_𝐶𝐻𝑂𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑗
+ 𝛽13𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗 + 𝛽14𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(1)  
where the dependent variable, COVENANT_CHOICE, is an indicator variable equal to one if firm 
i’s contract j starting in year t contains a lease-related covenant and zero otherwise. I use two 
dependent variables to capture changes in lenders’ covenant choices when borrowers adopt SFAS 
13. 
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 The first dependent variable, LEASE_RESTRICTION, indicates whether the contract 
contains a provision restricting leasing activity. The main variable of interest in the model is POST, 
an indicator equal to one if the loan start date occurred after the borrower adopted SFAS 13, and 
zero otherwise. If SFAS 13 accounting measures provide net monitoring benefits to the lender, I 
expect that lenders will be less likely to use lease restrictions. Thus, I predict a negative coefficient 
for β1. The second dependent variable, DEBT-EQUITY, indicates whether the contract contains a 
debt-to-equity ratio. If SFAS 13 measures capture economic liabilities arising from leasing 
activity, GAAP-based covenants may be more cost-effective to use relative to alternative 
covenants, and I expect that lenders are equally or more likely to use GAAP-based covenants. I 
expect lenders to use debt-equity ratios in the post-adoption period, allowing the balance-sheet 
capital lease liability to affect covenant calculations. Thus, I predict a positive coefficient on β1. 
 In addition to the POST variable, I include a measure of the importance of a firm’s leasing 
activity, LEASEINTENSITY, as the ratio of capital lease liability to pre-lease assets. Because of 
the lack of data on leasing activity both before and after the standard change, I measure leasing 
intensity in the year of SFAS 13 adoption. 7 As the choice of lease restriction in the pre- and post-
SFAS 13 periods could be confounded by the amount of leasing activity, I include this variable as 
a control in the model. Firms’ leasing activity is likely to change after adopting SFAS 13, and 
leasing activity is also likely correlated with lenders’ decision to restrict leasing activity. Thus, 
failing to include this variable would constitute an omitted variable problem that would bias the 
coefficient of β1. To account for variation in agency costs among borrowers, I include firm 
characteristics including SIZE, the log of market value of equity; LEVERAGE, the ratio of total 
                                                 
7 I provide more in depth discussion of how this variable is calculated in the Sample Selection section of the paper 
and in APPENDIX 1.2. 
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liabilities to market value of equity; BM, the book value of equity-to-market value of equity; ROA, 
return on assets; and TANGIBILITY, the ratio of net PP&E to total assets (e.g., Frankel, 
Seethamraju, and Zach 2008; Ball, Li, and Shivakumar 2013).  
 In addition to these measures, I include macroeconomic- and debt contract-level variables 
as controls. The sample period is characterized by volatile interest rates particularly in the early 
1980’s. To account for fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions, I include INDEXRETURNS, the 
12-month buy-and-hold value-weighted CRSP index returns ending on the date of contract 
initiation. I also include controls for debt contract characteristics: SECURED, loans that require 
collateral; MATURE, the log of loan maturity in years; LOANSIZE, the total loan proceeds scaled 
by total assets in the fiscal year prior to the loan start year; and SYNDICATE, an indicator for 
syndicated loans. Finally, debt covenants may overlap in restricting leasing activity. For example, 
a contract may include a lease restriction and a debt-equity ratio that capitalizes operating leases. 
To ensure that the results are not driven by contracts containing multiple lease-related covenants, 
I include OTHERLEASECOV, an indicator equal to one if a contract contains more than one 
covenant that restricts leases or capitalizes operating leases. 
 To investigate how covenant modifications change during the post-adoption period, I 
estimate the following model: 
 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑗 + 𝛼9𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑗
+ 𝛼10𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 + 𝛼11𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑗 + 𝛼12𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗
+ 𝛼13𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑗 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 
(2)  
where the dependent variable, NONGAAP, is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i’s 
contract j starting in year t capitalizes operating leases and zero otherwise. The main variable of 
interest, TREND, is a time trend from the beginning of the sample period to the end of the sample 
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period increasing by one for each subsequent year. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the probability of 
non-gaap adjustments that capitalize operating leases is increasing across time in the post-
adoption period. Thus, I expect a positive coefficient for 𝛼1. The remaining variables in the 
model are defined similarly to Equation 1 above.   
1.4  Sample Selection and Results 
1.4.1  Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
To form a sample of contracts, I focus on firms with high lease intensity before adopting 
SFAS 13. This subset of firms provides a powerful sample for examining the contracting effects 
of SFAS 13 adoption, and I designate this as the SFAS 13 Adoption Sample. To select the sample 
of contracts, I first identify the fiscal year of SFAS 13 adoption using Compustat footnote codes.8 
This initial screen of firms with available footnote codes limits the sample to 1,027 unique firms. 
Table 1 Panel A displays the frequency by fiscal year of SFAS 13 adoption for sample firms. 
Consistent with the SEC shortening the transition period, the majority of sample firms adopted 
SFAS 13 in 1978 with the remainder adopting in 1979. Thus, most firms in the sample had 
relatively short transition periods relative to the promulgation of SFAS 13 in November 1976. I 
further restrict the sample to firms with five consecutive years of Compustat coverage prior to the 
accounting rule change year to ensure that I have data to calculate firm variables around contract 
initiation. This screen yields a sample of 1,019 firms. In addition, I screen firms lacking data for 
return on assets, market value of equity, book to market, net income, or total assets. These screens 
reduce the sample size to 707 firms.  
Next, I proxy for leasing intensity prior to adoption using the capital lease liability in the 
year of adoption scaled by pre-lease total assets (i.e., total assets minus capital lease liability), then 
                                                 
8 See APPENDIX 1.2 for additional details regarding the sample selection and data collection procedures. 
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select firms with a ratio of at least 10 percent. These selection criteria yield a potential sample of 
170 firms. I use this sample to manually search the “Index to Exhibits” portion of available 10-K 
filings between 1971 and 1989 and hand collect all available private lending agreements. Finally, 
I manually code debt covenants, covenant adjustments, loan amounts, maturities, and other loan-
level data necessary for the empirical tests. These detailed hand collection procedures yield a 
sample of 113 lending agreements. After screening on available contract-level data, the final 
sample used in my analyses consists of 90 lending agreements (42 unique sample firms). Of these 
agreements, 23 are from the pre-SFAS 13 period (15 unique firms) and 67 are from the post-SFAS 
13 period (27 unique firms).  
Table 1 Panel B displays the industry distribution of sample firms using the Fama-French 
10 classification. Consistent with prior research, I find that sample firms are concentrated in certain 
industries (Ge 2006). As Panel B indicates, 67 percent of sample firms are in the Shops industry. 
Using a broader Fama-French classification (untabulated), 41 percent of firms are in the retail 
industry, 19 percent are in the wholesale industry, 13 percent in the transportation industry, and 10 
percent in the restaurant industry.  
 Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the SFAS 13 Adoption Sample.9 Panel A reports 
summary statistics for the full sample and for the pre- and post- SFAS 13 adoption subsamples. 
Notably, lease restrictions decline from the pre- to the post-SFAS 13 adoption periods with 70 
percent of contracts containing lease restrictions in the pre period and only 33 percent in the post 
period. The difference in means is significant at the one-percent level. The use of debt-equity 
covenants sees no significant change across subsamples while loan maturity increases 
                                                 
9 I winsorize continuous variables to mitigate the effect of outliers. Results remain significant when using the 
unwinsorized sample. 
[18] 
 
significantly. Figure 2 charts the proportion of pre- and post-SFAS 13 adoption contracts 
containing lease restrictions and debt equity ratios. The bar chart indicates visually the large drop 
in the use of lease restrictions, consistent with my predictions. In the pre-SFAS 13 period, debt 
contracts have an average maturity of 2.80 years. This contrasts with the post-SFAS 13 period in 
which average maturity is 4.34 years, an increase of 1.5 years, which is significant at the five-
percent level. Additionally, the use of collateral in debt contracts declines from 30 percent in the 
pre-adoption period to 13 percent in the post-adoption period. These statistics provide an indication 
that lenders may have changed contracting behavior after SFAS 13 adoption.  
 Panel B displays Spearman correlations for variables used in the regression analyses. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the variable Post is negatively correlated with the variable 
Lease_Restriction at the one-percent level. In addition, lease restrictions are significantly 
negatively correlated with the trend variable suggesting that lease restrictions are less likely to be 
included in contracts in later sample years. Moreover, lease restrictions are not positively 
correlated with capitalizing operating leases but are instead significantly negatively correlated. 
Lease_Restriction also exhibits significant correlations with firm characteristics such as firm size, 
leverage, and book-to-market which I control for in multivariate analyses.  
 Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the univariate results show little correlation between SFAS 
13 adoption and debt-equity ratio usage. This univariate result indicates that lenders neither 
significantly increase nor significantly decrease the use of debt-equity ratios. Finding no change 
in debt-equity ratios is not inconsistent with my hypothesis: 1) debt-equity ratios in the pre-
adoption period do not incorporate leases whereas post-adoption period ratios capture capital 
leases, 2) debt-equity ratios occur in nearly three-fourths of sample contracts, and 3) the use of 
debt-equity ratios remains relatively stable from the pre- to the post-adoption period. These 
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univariate statistics suggest it is plausible that lenders use debt-equity ratios as an alternative 
mechanism to lease restrictions to monitor borrower leasing activity.  
 Relating to the third hypothesis, Figure 3 charts the mean and median ratio of rental 
expense to capital leases for the universe of Compustat firms by year during the post-SFAS 13 
adoption period. Both lines trend upward indicating the shift in financing away from capital 
leases toward operating leases. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the occurrence of non-gaap lease 
covenants is positively and significantly correlated with the trend variable indicating that lease 
capitalization is more likely in later sample years. 
1.4.2  Results 
Table 3 presents results estimating Equation 1, the covenant choice model testing 
Hypothesis 1 relating to lease restrictions (H1). The table presents coefficient estimates of logistic 
regressions with Lease_Restriction as the dependent variable and Post as the explanatory variable 
of interest. Given the small sample size, I present four specifications beginning with a Post as the 
only explanatory variable and building to include controls to provide an indication of the strength 
of the main result. The first column estimates only the Post variable with a negative coefficient 
estimate significant at the one-percent level consistent with H1 that lease restrictions decline after 
SFAS 13 adoption. Column 2 introduces Lease Intensity to control for the amount of borrower 
leasing activity. In this specification, Post continues to be negative and significant. Columns 3 and 
4 include additional controls for borrower and loan characteristics and macroeconomic effects (i.e., 
IndexReturns). Across specifications, the sign and magnitude on Post remain fairly stable and are 
statistically significant indicating that contracting behavior for leases changed after adoption of 
SFAS 13 lease accounting rules. Proxies of agency costs generally support agency theory where 
larger firms and firms with more tangible assets are less likely to contain restrictions on leases 
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although book-to-market has a positive coefficient indicating that firms with more growth 
opportunities are less likely to restrict leasing activity.10 
To test Hypothesis 2 (H2) relating to the use of debt-equity ratios, I estimate a logistic 
model using Debt-Equity as the dependent variable indicating whether a contract contains a debt-
equity covenant consistent with GAAP.11 As in Table 3, I display four specifications building up 
the model from one explanatory variable, Post, to the full model with all controls. Beginning with 
the main variable of interest, I note that Post is negative and insignificant indicating no significant 
change in the probability of lenders writing debt-equity covenants. The coefficient remains 
insignificant across the four specifications when adding in control variables. Turning to the control 
variables, ROA is negative and significant indicating that when borrowers have higher ROA, 
lenders are much less likely to use debt-equity covenants. Importantly, debt-equity ratios are used 
more than 72 percent of the time in both the pre and the post periods in the univariate statistics. In 
the regression analyses, while I do not observe a significant increase in the likelihood of debt 
contracts including debt-equity ratios, I also do not observe a significant decline. Given that debt-
equity ratios are used heavily across sample periods, the multivariate results suggest that lenders 
use debt-equity ratios without lease restrictions to control risk related to leasing activity, imposing 
a lower contracting cost on the borrower. Together with the tests of H1 using Lease_Restriction, 
the findings indicate that capital lease liability as reported on the balance sheet provided lenders 
with a contractible measure to protect against lease-related credit risk.12  
                                                 
10 The positive coefficient for book-to-market is not completely inconsistent with the cost of lease covenants. 
Leasing represents an important source of financing, and restricting this funding source for firms with growth 
options may be too costly for the borrower to bear.  
11 For this analysis, I take care to code the debt-equity covenant equal to one only in instances where the covenant is 
defined strictly based on GAAP (i.e., the covenant makes no modifications to include off-balance-sheet leases). 
12 The SFAS 13 Adoption Sample spans 1972 to 1989. One concern with this sample period is that lending 
agreements multiple years away from SFAS 13 adoption are not likely to be affected by SFAS 13 alone. For 
example, the FASB issued updates to SFAS 13 in 1979, relating to renewals, sale-leaseback transactions, and 
contingent rentals. To address this concern, I estimate the models in Tables 3 and 4 using five-year windows 
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Turning to Table 5, I present coefficient estimates of logistic regressions from Equation 2 to test 
the third hypothesis. In this table, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
debt-equity covenant capitalizes operating leases. The key variable, α1, is a time trend, and the 
model is estimated for the post-adoption period only. Restricting the analysis to the post-
adoption period decreases the sample to 67 contracts. Table 5 presents four specifications 
building from a single regressor, TREND, to a specification including controls for borrower and 
loan characteristics. The first two columns indicate a positive and significant coefficient estimate 
for α1. The third and fourth columns include controls for the levels of rent expense and capital 
leases (both scaled by total assets) as borrower leasing activity varies across the sample period 
and is likely correlated with the choice of including non-GAAP covenant adjustments. TREND 
continues to exhibit a positive and significant coefficient indicating that the probability of 
capitalizing operating leases increases across time. These results suggest that lease-related 
covenants vary temporally consistent with the increased importance of operating leases relative 
to capital leases. 
1.4.3  Robustness 
In addition to the above analyses, I conduct various untabulated tests to assess the 
robustness of the results. One of the principal concerns in the identification of the model is the 
partitioning variable between the pre- and post-adoption periods. I rerun tests using an alternative 
measure of the POST variable where I define POST as contracts written after 1976, the year the 
FASB promulgated SFAS 13. Using the modified variable, the sign and magnitude of the 
coefficients is similar, and the statistical significance across specifications does not change.  
                                                 
surrounding the adoption window of 1977 to 1979. Coefficient estimates for Post are significant at the five-percent 
level using a five-year window surrounding SFAS 13 adoption. Additionally, all results in the paper are presented 
with two-sided t-statistics. 
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Another concern in the analyses relates to the trend in operating to capital leases. 
Specifically, the year 1988 shows a large spike in the ratio of operating to capital leases based on 
the universe of Compustat firms. To the extent that the sample contains outliers of rent-to-capital 
leases, the extreme observations could be driving the results. To test the robustness of the model 
of non-GAAP covenant adjustments in Equation 2, I exclude observations from the year 1988 and 
re-estimate the model. Excluding contracts from 1988 drops the sample to 61 contracts, and the 
coefficient estimates are stable in magnitude and sign across the four specifications. The statistical 
significance of TREND is significant at the five-percent level as a single regressor and including 
borrower and loan characteristics. When I include RENT, CAP, and TWOLEASECOV, the 
coefficient on TREND is no longer statistically different from zero with p-values of 10.1 and 11.8, 
respectively. Although the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels, it continues to have 
a positive sign and a magnitude similar to the specifications reported in Table 5. Overall, the results 
appear consistent with the original analysis, and I attribute the drop in significance in part to a lack 
of power due to the small sample size. 
Finally, the tables present results using logistic estimation, which imposes functional form 
assumptions on the model. In untabulated analyses, I estimate the models using probit and linear 
probability models. Re-estimating Tables 3 to 5 based on these alternative models, I find similar 
results in terms of sign, magnitude, and statistical significance. 
1.5  Conclusion 
This study examines the nature of borrowers’ and lenders’ demand for lease accounting 
rules. Given that leasing is such a prevalent form of financing and that leasing transactions have 
the potential to reduce loan value, changes in lease accounting standards represent a compelling 
setting for understanding how accounting rules affect lenders’ cost-benefit tradeoffs of using 
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GAAP measures for lending covenants. I provide evidence on lenders’ choice of lease-related debt 
covenants for loan contracts before and after borrowers adopt Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards 13: Accounting for Leases (SFAS 13). Using a hand-collected sample of private lending 
agreements, I find that lenders are significantly less likely to write covenants directly restricting 
leasing activity after borrowers adopt SFAS 13 lease accounting rules. I also find no significant 
change in the likelihood of using GAAP debt-equity covenants. These results suggest that SFAS 
13 measures of leasing activity capture borrower credit risk without the need to directly restrict 
leases. Moreover, the results indicate that lenders not only price protect against lease-associated 
credit risk but also rely on debt covenants to mitigate unexpected changes in borrower leasing 
activity. 
In addition to the above analyses, I investigate lenders’ response to SFAS 13 financial 
reporting rules in the post-adoption period. I document an increase in the ratio of rental expense to 
capital lease liability over time. In multivariate analyses, I find that the probability of capitalizing 
operating leases increases during the post-adoption period. Taken together, the findings suggest 
that lenders adapt to shifts in the economic magnitude of lease financing as borrowers entered into 
more operating leases as a form of financing relative to capital leases. 
The results of this study are timely in informing the debate regarding current and proposed 
accounting rules in the recent FASB Exposure Drafts (2010 and 2013) that propose substantial 
changes to financial reporting for leases. This study provides evidence from a contracting 
perspective that SFAS 13 accounting standards affect whether lenders define debt covenants 
based on GAAP measures and to what extent GAAP-based covenants enhance lenders’ ability to 
monitor borrower credit risk. This study also provides evidence that lenders modify contract 
terms in response to changes in the use of operating leases.  
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Appendix 1.1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
      
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Lease Restriction 
Indicator variable equal to one if a contract 
specifies a dollar threshold limitation on leasing 
activity and zero otherwise. 
Hand Collection 
Debt-Equity 
Indicator variable equal to one if a contract 
contains a debt-equity covenant and zero 
otherwise. 
Hand Collection 
Nongaap 
Indicator variable equal to one if a contract 
modifies GAAP definitions with respect to lease 
accounting and zero otherwise. 
Hand Collection 
      
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Post Indicator variable equal to one if a contract is 
initiated after the borrower adopts SFAS 13 and 
zero otherwise. 
  
Trend Time trend variable from the beginning of the post 
period until the end of the post period 
incrementing by year. 
  
Lease Intensity 
Calculated in the year of FAS 13 adoption 
('aftnt23') as the difference in capital lease liability 
(data84) between the adoption year and the prior 
fiscal year divided by total assets (data6) less 
adoption-year capital lease liability (data84). 
Compustat 
Size 
Log of market value of equity 
(log(data199*data25)). 
Compustat 
Leverage 
Total liabilities (data181) divided by market value 
of equity (data199*data25). 
Compustat 
BM 
Book value of equity (data60) divided by market 
value of equity (data199*data25). 
Compustat 
ROA 
Earnings before extraordinary items (data18) 
divided by total assets (data6). 
Compustat 
Tangibility Net PP&E (data8) divided by total assets (data6). Compustat 
IndexReturns 
Equal to 12-month CRSP value-weighted index 
returns from one year prior to contract initiation to 
the date of contract initiation. 
CRSP 
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Variable Definition Data Source 
      
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Spread 
Equals the log of spread plus 10 basis points. I 
calculate spread in two steps. First, at the facility 
level, I sum the stated interest rate margins and 
applicable benchmark rates such as LIBOR or 
Prime rate (excluding fees such as revolving 
credit commitment fees) then subtract off the 
Federal Funds Rate on the contract initiation 
date to calculate the spread. If a facility specifies 
multiple borrowing types such as LIBOR loans 
and Prime loans, I average the spread within the 
facility. Second, I calculate a weighted average 
spread at the package level using the facility 
amount. 
Hand Collection 
Mature Equals the log of loan maturity in years.   
Loan Size Log of loan principal at the package level. Hand Collection 
Secured 
Indicator variable equal to one if a loan requires 
collateral and zero otherwise. 
Hand Collection 
Syndicate 
Indicator variable equal to one if a loan is from a 
syndicate of lenders and zero otherwise. 
Hand Collection 
OtherLeaseCov 
Indicator variable equal to one if a loan contains 
more than one covenant relating to leases (e.g., 
debt-equity covenants in combination with lease 
restrictions). 
Hand Collection 
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Appendix 1.2: Details of Sample Selection for 
SFAS 13 Adoption Sample 
I focus on firms with high lease intensity before adopting SFAS 13 because adopting the 
standards should have a large effect on both borrowers and lenders. However, leasing intensity is 
not readily observable in the pre-SFAS 13 period because the prior accounting standards required 
only disclosure of future lease payments. It was with the advent of SFAS 13 and the differentiation 
of capital and operating leases that Compustat first provided coverage of footnoted future 
minimum lease payments. Indeed, (Ge 2006) notes that Compustat lacks coverage of the 
“thereafter” portion of footnoted operating leases prior to 2000. Hence, selecting the sample on 
leasing activity at the time of contracting is not feasible. 
However, a unique data item in Compustat enables us to calculate a measure of the amount 
of capital leases brought onto the balance sheet as a result of SFAS 13 adoption. Compustat collects 
limited data on firms that disclose the adoption of new accounting rules. The Compustat data item 
‘aftnt23’ provides a marker, “AC” (i.e., Accounting Change) to signify the fiscal year in which the 
firm applied SFAS 13. An additional feature of Compustat coverage I exploit for sample selection 
is that SFAS 13 stipulates that firms retroactively apply the lease accounting standard and restate 
prior year balance sheet information. Thus, in the year of adoption, the financial statements 
appearing in the 10-K or Annual Report display both the current and prior year as if the firm had 
applied SFAS 13 in both periods. To be consistent with accounting rules in effect at the time 
financial statements were submitted, in the year prior to adoption, Compustat continues to reflect 
the balance sheet with the pre-SFAS 13 rules rather than the retroactively applied balance sheet 
amounts—i.e., Compustat does not compile data on retroactively applied SFAS 13 lease liabilities. 
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In theory, capital lease liabilities for firm-years prior to SFAS 13 are “0”. 13 In the year of adoption, 
the capital lease liability will reflect the new lease accounting rules and have an amount recognized 
as a capital lease liability. Thus, I define Lease Intensity using the following formula where t 
represents the fiscal year of SFAS 13 adoption: 
𝑳𝑬𝑨𝑺𝑬 𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑬𝑵𝑺𝑰𝑻𝒀 =
(𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑳𝑬𝑨𝑺𝑬 𝑳𝑰𝑨𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒕)
(𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑨𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑻𝑺𝒕 − 𝑪𝑨𝑷𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑳 𝑳𝑬𝑨𝑺𝑬 𝑳𝑰𝑨𝑩𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝒀𝒕)
 
I measure leasing intensity as the capital lease liability in the initial adoption year, scaled by pre-
lease total assets (i.e., total assets minus capital lease liability), then select firms that experience a 
change in capital lease liability to pre-lease total assets of at least 10 percent. These are firms that 
had off-balance sheet leases that met SFAS 13 criteria to have capital lease treatment and are firms 
for which lenders will most likely consider leasing activity in writing loan covenants. The capital 
lease liability in the year of adoption proxies for the financial statement effect of the new lease 
standard.14 To validate the footnote code noting the fiscal year of SFAS 13 adoption, I cross-
                                                 
13 A small number of firms have a positive value for capital lease liability in Compustat. Accounting rules per APB 
5 provide for firms booking a lease liability for lease agreements that are installment purchases (from the side of the 
lessee or installment sales from the side of the lessor). 
14 The amount of capital lease liability coming onto the books in the adoption year is only a proxy for the effect of 
the standard. Taking the difference between the adoption-year SFAS 13 capital lease liability and the pre-SFAS 13 
capital lease liability yields an amount that can be decomposed into distinct portions relating to the effect of SFAS 
13 adoption and changes the firm makes to its leasing activity during the adoption year as in the following formula: 
 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸 𝐿𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌
=  [𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑡−1,𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑡−1,𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝐹𝐴𝑆13]
+ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸 𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑡,𝐹𝐴𝑆13 
 
The effect of SFAS 13 is shown in brackets. In the year prior to SFAS 13 adoption, most firms had no capital lease 
liability because they did not apply the new standard. In the year of adoption, the firms were required to present 
comparative balance sheet amounts as if SFAS 13 had been in effect in the prior year. Comparing these two amounts 
is the correct measure for determining the effect of SFAS 13 on the firm—i.e., how much capital lease liability did 
SFAS 13 adoption bring onto the balance sheet. The remaining amount of the change in capital lease liability 
represents either additions to capital leases or deletions of capital leases in the adoption year. One concern for 
sample selection is that firms were actively restructuring leasing contracts to achieve operating lease accounting 
treatment (Imhoff and Thomas 1988). If the change in leasing contracts is unobservable, it could induce sample 
selection bias. For a small number of firms, I manually calculated the decomposed change in capital lease liability 
using restated amounts from financial statements in the SFAS 13 adoption year and note that firms tended to add 
capital leases in the transition year rather than decrease the amount of capital leases. This alleviates concerns that 
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checked 20 observations by inspecting the “Significant Accounting Policies” section of the 
financial statements in the 10-K filings or Annual Reports in the year of adoption to ensure that 
Compustat accurately identified the fiscal year of adoption. I found only one instance where the 
Compustat code was applied to the incorrect year.15 
 To collect lending agreements pre- and post-SFAS 13 adoption, I use the following 
procedures. As noted in prior studies, the Dealscan loan data are limited prior to the 1990’s and 
the data come from two principal sources including 10-K filings from the SEC. Because the SEC 
maintains only sparse electronic storage of 10-K and other filings prior to the 1994 EDGAR 
implementation, I obtain 10-K filings for my sample firms from microfiche copies of the filings 
located in the Olin Library at Washington University in St. Louis. I first identify all available 10-
K filings in the library collection for my sample firms. Due to limitations in the microfiche 
collection, I lose 35 firms. For the remaining firms, I look for the “Index to Exhibits”, a listing of 
contracts and agreements required in the 10-K filing to identify potential lending agreements. The 
Index to Exhibits notes whether a listed contract is included as an attachment to the 10-K or 
incorporated by reference to a previous filing such as an 8-K or 10-Q. Once I identify all the 
                                                 
firms shifted away from capital leases in the adoption year. It could be the case that sample firms adjusted leasing 
activity even before year t-1; however, the transition periods for my sample periods are mostly within one or two 
years. 
15 Any potential errors in the fiscal year of SFAS 13 adoption will affect the calculation of the lease intensity 
calculation. The lease intensity calculation exploits the footnote code by showing the increase in balance sheet lease 
liability that is due to SFAS 13 plus or minus additions or discontinuances of lease contracts that would be 
capitalized per SFAS 13. For accurate footnote codes, the change calculation will yield a large change for firms that 
are most affected by SFAS 13. The change will be small for firms with few leases affected by the new standard. If a 
firm adopted SFAS 13 in 1977, but Compustat miscoded the adoption year as 1978, then the lease intensity 
calculation would compare 1978 to 1977, where both years are post-adoption. If Compustat miscoded the adoption 
year as 1977 but the firm adopted in 1978, then the lease-intensity calculation would compare 1977 to 1976, where 
both years are pre-adoption. In either case, the error observations will result in computing a small change in balance-
sheet lease amounts. If the error observation had few leases affected by SFAS 13, then the error does not affect 
sample selection. If the error observation had many leases affected by SFAS 13, then the firm would be 
misclassified as having a small change in balance-sheet lease amounts and would, therefore, be excluded from the 
sample. Hence, any coding errors would result in a smaller sample. As long as coding errors occur randomly, sample 
selection bias does not present a concern. 
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potential lending agreements, I scan all available agreements that are included as attachments to 
the 10-K filings in the library collection. For the remaining contracts incorporated by reference, I 
submit document requests to the SEC to obtain the lending agreements attached to other filings 
not in the library collection.   
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Figure 1.1: SFAS 13 Adoption 
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Figure 1.1: SFAS 13 Adoption. This figure presents observed financial reporting for leases 
and lease-related lending covenants in periods before and after SFAS 13 adoption. 
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Figure 1.2: Lease-Related Debt Covenants Surrounding SFAS 13 Adoption 
 
  
 
                  
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
Figure 1.2: Lease-Related Debt Covenants Surrounding SFAS 13 Adoption. This figure 
displays a bar chart of sample means of GAAP leverage ratios (in red) and lease 
restrictions (in blue) in the pre- and post-SFAS 13 adoption periods. This figure 
illustrates the change in lease-related covenants within the sample from the pre- to the 
post-SFAS 13 adoption period. 
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Figure 1.3: Rental Expense to Capital Lease Liability Over Time 
                  
 
  
 
                
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
Figure 1.3: Rental Expense to Capital Lease Liability Over Time. This figure graphs 
the ratio of rental expense (data47) to capital lease liability (data84), the Rent-to-
Capital Lease Ratio, during the post-SFAS 13-adoption period starting with the last 
adoption year of the SFAS-13 Adoption Sample (i.e., 1978) through the end of the 
sample period (i.e., 1989). The solid line with triangular markers plots the fiscal-year 
mean of the Rent-to-Capital Lease Ratio. The dashed line with dot markers plots the 
fiscal-year median of the Rent-to-Capital Lease Ratio. The y-axis measures the 
magnitude of the Rent-to-Capital Lease Ratio. The x-axis displays fiscal years (yeara). 
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TABLE 1.1 
SFAS 13 Adoption Sample 
Panel A: SFAS 13 Adoption by Fiscal 
Year         
Fiscal Year   # Firms   % Firms   
1977   7   16.7   
1978   25   59.5   
1979   10   23.8   
Total   42   100   
            
Panel B: Firm Observations by Industry (Fama-French 
10)       
Industry Group   # Firms   % Firms   
Healthcare   2   4.8   
Manufacturing   2   4.8   
NonDurables   10   23.8   
Shops   28   66.6   
Total   42   100   
            
            
Table 1.1 presents sample distributions across time and industries. Panel A displays 
the distribution of SFAS 13 adoption by year. Panel B displays industry distributions 
using the Fama-French 10 classification. 
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TABLE 1.2 
Descriptive Statistics for SFAS 13 Adoption Sample 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Full Sample   
Pre-SFAS 13  
Contracts   
Post-SFAS 13 
Contracts   
Post_loan = 0  
vs.  
Post_loan =1 
  
  N=90   N=23   N=67     
Variable Mean Median Std Dev   Mean Median   Mean Median   
Difference 
in means t-stat   
Lease_restriction 0.42 0.00 0.50   0.70 1.00   0.33 0.00   -0.37 -3.22 *** 
Debt-equity 0.73 1.00 0.44   0.78 1.00   0.72 1.00   -0.07 -0.61   
Nongaap 0.26 0.00 0.44   0.17 0.00   0.28 0.00   0.11 1.04   
Trend 9.40 9.00 4.44   3.52 3.00   11.42 11.00   7.90 16.89 *** 
Lease Intensity 0.22 0.18 0.13   0.24 0.14   0.22 0.18   -0.02 -0.67   
MVE 240.49 127.63 342.15   103.20 77.25   287.62 160.90   184.42 3.70 *** 
Leverage 2.51 1.61 2.78   3.32 2.63   2.23 1.47   -1.09 -1.33   
BM 1.18 0.92 1.06   1.61 1.29   1.03 0.82   -0.57 -1.87 * 
ROA 0.04 0.04 0.03   0.03 0.04   0.04 0.04   0.01 0.96   
Tangibility      0.45       0.40       0.17          0.38        0.35         0.47       0.41           0.09        2.18  ** 
IndexReturns 0.13 0.16 0.20   -0.02 -0.12   0.18 0.20   0.21 4.77 *** 
Spread 0.01 0.01 0.01   0.02 0.02   0.01 0.01   0.00 -0.61   
Maturity 3.95 3.02 2.70   2.80 2.02   4.34 3.24   1.54 2.42 ** 
LoanSize    110.48      24.75     252.86         25.16       20.00       139.77      38.57         114.61  3.21 *** 
Secured 0.18 0.00 0.38   0.30 0.00   0.13 0.00   -0.17 -1.85 * 
Syndicate 0.57 1.00 0.50   0.57 1.00   0.57 1.00   0.00 0.02   
OtherLeaseCov 0.19 0.00 0.39   0.09 0.00   0.22 0.00   0.14 1.45   
                            
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for firm-level and contract-level data used to estimate Equation (1) for a sample of contracts in the pre- and 
post-SFAS 13 adoption periods. Panel A presents summary statistics and Panel B presents Spearman correlations (bolded items are significant at the 
1% level). The table displays descriptive statistics for the full sample of contracts, the subsample of pre-SFAS 13 adoption contracts, and the 
subsample of post-SFAS 13 adoption contracts. The far right columns display the difference in means between the pre-SFAS 13 adoption subsample 
(Post = 0) and the post-SFAS 13 adoption subsample (Post = 1) with t-statistics testing the significance of this difference using a t-test. ***, **, and * 
indicate that differences in means are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. See APPENDIX 1.1 for variable definitions.  
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Panel B: Spearman Correlations                                 
                                      
    (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Lease_restriction -0.10 -0.40 -0.38 -0.32 -0.08 -0.33 0.29 0.32 -0.15 -0.23 -0.14 0.45 0.04 -0.03 0.13 0.07 0.22 
(2) Debt-equity   0.30 0.14 -0.07 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.02 -0.28 -0.11 -0.07 0.15 -0.07 0.03 0.15 -0.02 0.23 
(3) Nongaap     0.36 0.11 0.18 0.27 -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 0.12 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.24 
(4) Trend       0.76 0.09 0.38 -0.35 -0.44 0.10 0.05 0.35 -0.13 0.15 0.26 -0.11 0.12 0.12 
(5) Post         -0.01 0.21 -0.14 -0.25 0.16 0.28 0.43 -0.06 0.26 0.22 -0.19 0.00 0.15 
(6) Lease Intensity           0.15 -0.01 -0.15 -0.11 0.46 0.04 0.01 -0.15 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.13 
(7) Size             -0.38 -0.33 0.22 0.22 -0.09 -0.32 0.32 0.06 -0.09 0.31 0.07 
(8) Leverage               0.87 -0.65 -0.12 0.12 0.39 0.04 -0.29 0.28 0.10 0.13 
(9) BM                 -0.47 -0.18 0.05 0.25 0.05 -0.33 0.16 0.05 0.12 
(10) ROA                   0.10 -0.19 -0.38 0.07 0.19 -0.38 -0.07 -0.09 
(11) Tangibility                     0.15 -0.04 -0.05 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.15 
(12) IndexReturns                       0.09 0.02 -0.06 0.11 -0.08 0.02 
(13) Spread                         -0.04 -0.04 0.21 0.02 0.10 
(14) Mature                           0.13 -0.41 0.32 -0.05 
(15) LoanSize                             0.02 0.44 0.02 
(16) Secured                               0.00 0.22 
(17) Syndicate                                 0.02 
(18) OtherLeaseCov                                   
                                      
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for firm-level and contract-level data used to estimate Equation (1) for a sample of contracts in the pre- and post-SFAS 13 
adoption periods. Panel A presents summary statistics and Panel B presents Spearman correlations (bolded items are significant at the 1% level). The table displays 
descriptive statistics for the full sample of contracts, the subsample of pre-SFAS 13 adoption contracts, and the subsample of post-SFAS 13 adoption contracts. The 
far right columns display the difference in means between the pre-SFAS 13 adoption subsample (Post = 0) and the post-SFAS 13 adoption subsample (Post = 1) with 
t-statistics testing the significance of this difference using a t-test. ***, **, and * indicate that differences in means are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. See APPENDIX 1.1 for variable definitions.  
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TABLE 1.3 
Covenant Choice Model: Lease Restrictions 
            
Variable 
Lease 
Restriction 
Lease 
Restriction 
Lease 
Restriction 
Lease 
Restriction   
            
Post -1.5423*** -1.5582*** -1.5039* -2.3941**   
  [-2.94] [-2.91] [-1.79] [-2.55]   
            
Lease Intensity   -0.6362 7.9903* 11.2489***   
    [-0.32] [1.68] [2.65]   
            
Size     -0.5337* -0.6589**   
      [-1.78] [-1.98]   
            
Leverage     -0.2500 -0.4657*   
      [-1.24] [-1.65]   
            
BM     2.4521* 2.7098**   
      [1.95] [2.16]   
            
ROA     43.2642 50.3777   
      [1.63] [1.49]   
            
Tangibility     -5.7913* -8.7343**   
      [-1.65] [-1.96]   
            
IndexReturns     -2.4641 -0.7704   
      [-1.40] [-0.31]   
            
Spread     20.5542*** 24.2782***   
      [2.76] [3.75]   
            
Mature     1.0203* 1.4090**   
      [1.81] [2.54]   
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Variable 
Lease 
Restriction 
Lease 
Restriction 
Lease 
Restriction 
Lease 
Restriction   
            
LoanSize     0.0000 0.0000   
      [1.10] [0.36]   
            
Secured     0.5491 0.1948   
      [0.42] [0.21]   
            
Syndicate     -0.3650 -0.3509   
      [-0.41] [-0.37]   
            
OtherLeaseCov       3.3295   
        [1.58]   
            
            
N 90 90 90 90   
Pseudo R-
Squared 7.74% 7.85% 46.30% 53.35%   
            
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in brackets       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
            
Table 1.3 presents coefficient estimates from a logit model estimating Equation (1) for the 
SFAS 13 Adoption Sample of lending contracts collected before and after SFAS 13 adoption. 
The dependent variable, Lease Restriction, is an indicator equal to one for contracts that contain 
lease restrictions and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest, POST, is an indicator 
variable equal to one for periods after a borrower adopts SFAS 13 lease accounting standards. 
See APPENDIX 1.1 for detailed definitions of the remaining independent variables.  
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TABLE 1.4 
Covenant Choice Model: Debt-Equity Covenants 
          
Variable     Debt-Equity   
          
Post     -0.1078   
      [-0.12]   
          
Lease Intensity     3.3792   
      [1.06]   
          
Size     0.2837   
      [1.01]   
          
Leverage     -0.0179   
      [-0.09]   
          
BM     0.1156   
      [0.21]   
          
ROA     -26.1351**   
      [-2.24]   
          
Tangibility     -1.8364   
      [-0.85]   
          
IndexReturns     -1.4000   
      [-0.87]   
          
Spread     3.1066   
      [1.62]   
          
Mature     -0.3404   
      [-0.68]   
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Variable     Debt-Equity   
          
LoanSize     0.0000*   
      [1.71]   
          
Secured     -0.0203   
      [-0.02]   
          
Syndicate     -0.8574   
      [-1.17]   
          
OtherLeaseCov     1.9504*   
      [1.68]   
          
          
N     90   
Pseudo R-Squared     19.21%   
          
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in brackets     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
          
Table 1.4 presents coefficient estimates from a logit model estimating Equation (1) for the SFAS 
13 Adoption Sample of lending agreements collected before and after SFAS 13 adoption. The 
dependent variable, Debt-Equity, is an indicator variable equal to one if a loan contract contains 
a debt-to-equity covenant that is based on GAAP and not adjusted with respect to leases and zero 
otherwise. The main variable of interest, POST, is an indicator variable equal to one for periods 
after a borrower adopts SFAS 13 lease accounting standards. See APPENDIX 1.1 for detailed 
definitions of the remaining independent variables.  
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TABLE 1.5 
Covenant Choice Model: Non-GAAP Adjustments 
          
Variable     Non-GAAP   
          
Trend     0.7021**   
      [2.17]   
          
Size     -0.3865   
      [-0.73]   
          
Leverage     0.3971   
      [0.98]   
          
BM     -0.6217   
      [-0.59]   
          
ROA     18.0380   
      [1.06]   
          
Tangibility     5.3825**   
      [2.33]   
          
IndexReturns     -2.8727   
      [-1.43]   
          
Spread     1.4982   
      [0.59]   
          
Mature     0.1180   
      [0.26]   
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Variable     Non-GAAP   
          
LoanSize     0.0000   
      [0.24]   
          
Secured     -0.3449   
      [-0.31]   
          
Syndicate     0.3178   
      [0.43]   
          
OtherLeaseCov     0.7838   
      [0.91]   
          
          
N     67   
Pseudo R-Squared     30.56%   
          
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in brackets     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
          
Table 1.5 presents logit model coefficient estimates estimating Equation (1) for the SFAS 13 
Adoption Sample of lending agreements collected before and after SFAS 13 adoption. The 
dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if financial covenants make non-GAAP 
adjustments for leases and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest, TREND, is a time trend 
variable from the beginning of the post period until the end of the post period incrementing by 
year. See APPENDIX 1.1 for detailed definitions of the remaining independent variables. 
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Chapter 2: Do Lenders Uniformly Capitalize 
Operating Leases in Debt Covenants? 
2.1 Introduction 
 At the center of the debate regarding proposed lease accounting standards is the extent to 
which leases should be capitalized on the balance sheet. Lease contracts vary substantially in 
nature from equipment rentals to land and office buildings and characteristics including lease 
term, renewal options, and residual value guarantees. Disagreement exists among financial 
statement users and between the FASB and IASB on the degree to which different types of leases 
receive different financial reporting treatment.16 The purpose of this study is to examine the 
relation between operating lease characteristics and contractual definitions of lease-related 
financial covenants in private lending contracts to provide empirical evidence regarding whether 
lenders treat operating leases equally or differently in debt covenants based on operating lease 
characteristics. 
 Current accounting rules specify bright-line thresholds to partition leases into capital or 
operating leases for financial reporting.17 The leasing industry has evolved based on these 
thresholds with lease contracts becoming increasingly more complex to achieve operating lease 
classification, which avoids recognition of the leases on the balance sheet (Imhoff Jr., Lipe, and 
Wright 1991). While the contracts have evolved, financial statement users question whether 
                                                 
16 For example, the FASB supports a “dual approach” for leases. Most capital or financing leases separately report 
amortization of the lease asset and interest expense on the lease liability whereas most operating leases report a 
single lease expense. The IASB in contrast supports a single financial reporting approach where all capitalized 
leases separately report amortization of the lease asset and interest expense on the lease liability (Tysiac 2014). 
17 See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 13: Accounting for Leases (SFAS 13) or Accounting Standards 
Codification 840 (ASC 840). 
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accounting rules faithfully represent the economic substance of these transactions. Prior research 
in lease accounting indicates that credit market participants account for operating leases in credit 
ratings (e.g., Kraft 2012) and that private lenders do not price operating leases uniformly 
(Altamuro et al. 2013). Similar to Altamuro et al. (2013), I expect banks to adjust for operating 
leases on a case-by-case basis depending on lease characteristics. However, I consider how lenders 
incorporate lease heterogeneity into debt covenant definitions. Prior research argues for the unique 
role of debt covenants for monitoring (see, e.g., Tirole 2006 and Chava and Roberts 2008) and 
finds evidence consistent with the distinctive role of debt covenants in the context of lease 
accounting (Graden 2014). Understanding whether leases are given equal treatment for debt 
covenants is important because debt covenants mitigate unexpected wealth transfers from debt 
holders to shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Tirole 2006). In this paper, I study the 
association between operating lease characteristics and the likelihood that lenders capitalize or 
adjust for operating leases for debt covenant calculations (i.e., non-GAAP adjustments) to provide 
empirical evidence of lenders’ demand for contractible measures of leasing activity.  
 From a contracting perspective, lenders have incentive to mitigate circumstances that lower 
the value of the debt. Lease contracts, if structured in the right way, may affect the value of lenders’ 
claims due to the effect of lease terms on the lenders’ ultimate priority in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy 
courts treat leases as either executory contracts (i.e., administrative expenses) or security interests 
(UCC).18 How bankruptcy courts characterize leases affects the priority of payments in arrears and 
distributions from the bankruptcy estate to creditors (Oei 2008). If the court rules a lease as an 
                                                 
18 Courts differentiate between “true leases” and “security interests.” The true lease designation is used when the 
court deems a lease arrangement to be an executory contract which receives priority treatment similar to 
administrative expenses necessary for the on-going operation of the bankrupt firm. The security interest designation 
is used when the court deems a lease arrangement to be a financing arrangement or debt-financed asset purchase 
(Mayer 2005). 
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executory contract and the lessee chooses to continue using the leased asset (i.e., the lessee 
“assumes” the lease), the lessor has a priority claim to payments in arrears.19 Alternatively, if the 
court rules a lease as a security interest, then lessors are ranked with creditors on a pro rata basis 
implying that existing creditors’ claims may be diluted with the influx of lessors as additional 
claimants of the bankruptcy estate (Eisfeldt and Rampini 2009). These stylized facts from the 
bankruptcy code provide a setting to test lenders’ incentives to incorporate operating leases into 
debt covenants depending on underlying lease characteristics. Both cases above predict a higher 
probability of loss conditional on bankruptcy. Because of the unique role covenants play in 
protecting creditors, I predict that leases with greater risk of being assumed by the lessee or being 
characterized by the bankruptcy court as security interests are associated with a higher probability 
of lenders capitalizing operating leases in financial covenants. 
 Practitioners and regulators argue that the leasing industry has evolved substantially since 
the promulgation of SFAS 13 in 1976. Particularly, operating lease agreements are much more 
prevalent in recent years and have become more complex (e.g., Imhoff Jr., Lipe, and Wright 1991; 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2005). To provide the most relevant contract data to 
inform standard setting, I hand-collected a sample of private debt contracts from 2008 to 2011 and 
determine how lenders adjust for borrowers’ operating leases. Multivariate analyses show a 
significant positive relation between a proxy for lease contract duration and the probability of the 
lending contract capitalizing operating leases (i.e., non-gaap adjustments).20 The evidence suggests 
                                                 
19 If the lessee rejects the lease, the lessee must relinquish possession of the leased asset (e.g., returning equipment 
or vacating a retail shopping location) but is under no obligation to continue lease payments or cure payments in 
arrears. The lessor may sue for damages but is limited in the amount it can claim for unpaid rent at one year’s rent or 
15 percent of the rent to be paid over the remaining term of the lease not exceeding three years (Ayer, Bernstein, and 
Friedland 2004). 
20 Leases with longer terms represent a greater risk to lenders’ loss conditional on default because such leases are 
more likely to be recharacterized as debt in bankruptcy proceedings (Eisfeldt and Rampini 2009). Synthetic leases 
are contracts that are carefully structured to be classified as rentals for financial reporting purposes (i.e., operating 
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that lenders are aware of variation in lease terms and account for these terms when writing 
covenants. While the sample size and infrequent nature of other lease characteristics such as 
guaranteed residual value leases yield no significant associations with non-gaap covenant 
adjustments for operating leases, the findings provide modest evidence that lenders do not 
uniformly capitalize operating leases. These results are important in the standard-setting process 
by providing empirical evidence of the nature of lenders’ demand for lease accounting rules. 
 This study contributes to several areas of the accounting literature including research on 
lease accounting rules and debt contract design. First, FASB’s exposure draft capitalizes nearly all 
lease transactions with the intent of improving the financial reporting transparency of leases. Prior 
research, however, documents differences among financial statement user groups’ treatment of 
operating leases. Extant studies generally find that equity investors capitalize all operating leases 
(Lipe 2001). In contrast to equity investors, Altamuro et al. (2013) find evidence suggesting that 
lenders discriminate among operating leases when setting loan spreads. In contrast with the 
proposed lease accounting standard, my findings suggest that lenders do not uniformly capitalize 
operating leases when writing debt covenants.  
Second, I provide an additional explanation of lenders’ demand for accounting rules—
bankruptcy costs. The evidence is consistent with lenders avoiding bankruptcy-related costs by 
selectively capitalizing operating leases based on lease characteristics. Prior studies suggest that 
bankruptcy rules affect lessors’ right of repossession (Eisfeldt and Rampini 2009), the price of 
private loans (Altamuro et al. 2013), and debt-market participants’ sensitivity to purchase 
obligations relative to operating leases (Andrade, Henry, and Nanda 2014). The findings of this 
                                                 
leases) and economic liabilities, or capital leases, for tax purposes. Synthetic leases are treated as economic 
liabilities for bankruptcy purposes (Altamuro 2006). 
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paper indicate that bankruptcy rules affect private lenders’ incentives to adjust for operating leases 
in debt covenants. 
 Finally, I contribute to studies of debt contract design. The debt contract design 
literature explores detailed contractual features documenting how lenders use accounting 
information in the contracting setting. Early studies investigate features of bond covenants 
(Smith and Warner 1979; Leftwich 1983). Recent studies investigate contracting changes around 
mandatory accounting pronouncements (e.g., Frankel, Seethamraju, and Zach 2008; Ball, Li, and 
Shivakumar 2013) and investigate trends toward income-statement based financial covenants 
that are associated with increased application of fair value accounting (e.g., Li 2010; Demerjian 
2011; Li 2012). These studies provide evidence consistent with fair value adjustments and 
transitory accruals diminishing the value of GAAP for debt contracting. My findings document 
how lenders use current GAAP rules to incorporate leases into financial covenants and provide 
evidence of the nature of lenders’ demand for lease accounting rules in the context of writing 
financial covenants. 
2.2  Background and Hypotheses 
2.2.1  Distinguishing Among Lease Types 
 The distinction between capital and operating leases has been at the heart of opposing 
views towards financial reporting for leases. The incumbent accounting standard, SFAS 13, 
partitions leases according to four bright-line criteria based on lease contract terms. On the 
FASB’s standard-setting agenda has been revamping the bright-line thresholds in a joint project 
with the IASB. While the two standard setters and financial statement users generally agree that 
the right to use an asset has value that should be recognized on the face of the balance sheet, 
disagreement exists regarding the treatment of leases across asset classes such as real estate and 
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equipment as well as across industries. A recent article highlights the challenges of this joint 
work noting that, “the two boards came to different conclusions in preliminary votes on financial 
reporting guidance for lessees and for lessors. The boards will meet again…in an effort to 
resolve their differences and move forward together with the difficult project, which was first 
placed on their agendas in 2006 (Tysiac 2014).” Financial statement users expressed concern that 
the FASB’s first Exposure Draft from August 2010 did not properly account for differences 
between real estate and equipment leases. Accordingly, in a second Exposure Draft issued in 
May 2013, the FASB proposed a “dual approach” of financial reporting treatment effectively 
differentiating between real estate leases and all other leases. The length of the standard-setting 
process and the quantity and divided nature of feedback from comment letters indicates the 
difficulty of how to draw the line between leases that represent assets financed with debt and 
leases that do not. The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence under the current 
financial reporting standards of how lenders draw the line between capital and operating leases 
when writing debt covenants.   
2.2.2  Bankruptcy Treatment: True Leases or Security Interests 
 One of the principal reasons lenders are likely to avoid a “one-size-fits all” method to 
account for leases relates to how leases are treated in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy courts refer to leases 
as either true leases or (disguised) security interests. 21 True leases are treated as executory 
contracts (i.e., administrative claims) in bankruptcy that are either assumed or rejected by the 
debtor or trustee (i.e., the lessee), subject to court approval (UCC). If the lessee assumes a lease, 
the lessee is allowed to continue to make payments and maintain possession or use of the leased 
                                                 
21 See In re Integrated Health Service Inc., 260 B. R. 71 [Bankr. D. Del. 2001] for an example of a court case 
distinguishing between true leases and security interests.  
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asset. However, the lessee must cure any defaults on lease payments in arrears. In the legal 
literature, lessees are required to “cure and assure” meaning that to continue the use of a leased 
asset, the lessee must pay the lessor any payments in arrears or provide adequate guarantee that 
payments will be made. These payments to cure receive priority treatment over creditors who are 
not allowed repossession of leased assets due to the automatic stay imposed by the bankruptcy 
court and who must wait until the reorganization plan under Chapter 11 is implemented to receive 
a pro rata share of the bankruptcy estate (Ayer, Bernstein, and Friedland 2004). Thus, lease 
payments in arrears receive priority over lenders’ claims.22 Leases ruled by the court to be security 
interests receive the same treatment as other financing arrangements: leased assets become part of 
the bankruptcy estate subject to automatic stay and lessors fall in line with other creditors for 
repayment (Krishnan and Moyer 1994). Legal research notes that determining the character of 
lease transactions occurs frequently in bankruptcy courts and has significant ramifications for 
lessees, lessors, and creditors (Abatemarco and Sabino 2008; Oei 2008). In essence, a borrower 
with leases that are reported as operating leases for financial statements may be deemed by the 
bankruptcy court to be (disguised) security interests in which case a lenders’ share of the 
bankruptcy estate is diluted by the addition of lessors who receive their pro rata share alongside 
lenders. Hence, I expect that lenders selectively adjust for leases in debt covenants based on 
potential bankruptcy costs:  
H1: Lenders are more likely to make non-GAAP covenant adjustments related to operating 
leases when the lease is likely to be treated as a security interest by the court. 
                                                 
22 Distinguishing between leases that are more likely than other leases to be assumed by a lessee in bankruptcy is an 
empirical challenge. Without observing lease contracts and bankruptcy payouts, it is difficult to determine whether 
true leases or security interests have higher expected losses in bankruptcy. Thus, I do not explicitly test nor draw 
conclusions about the predictions related to assumed leases in bankruptcy. The inferences relate only to 
circumstances in which the bankruptcy court is likely to classify an operating lease as a security interest. 
[51] 
 
2.3  Research Design 
 The hypothesis predicts that lenders are more likely to capitalize a borrower’s operating 
leases when the leases have characteristics that increase the probability of being characterized as 
security interests by the bankruptcy court. To test this hypothesis, I employ the following model:  
 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛
− 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(1)  
where the dependent variable, Nongaap, is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i’s contract j 
starting in year t capitalizes operating leases into financial covenants and zero otherwise. The 
explanatory variable of interest is Lease_term. SFAS 13 specifies four criteria to determine the 
classification of a lease. One of these criteria compares the length of the lease term to the useful 
life of the leased asset. The longer the lease term relative to the useful life of the asset, the more 
the leasing agreement is like a financed purchase (rather than a rental). Because I do not have 
access to lease agreements and lease contract terms, I use disclosed future minimum lease 
payments to derive a measure to proxy for the duration of a firm’s leases. SFAS 13 disclosure rules 
require a schedule of future minimum lease payments five years from the balance sheet date with 
an aggregate amount of all future minimum lease payments thereafter.  
 Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Altamuro et al. 2013; Andrade et al. 2014) and the 
Standard & Poor’s method of capitalizing operating leases (Standard & Poor’s 2013), I measure 
Lease_term as the sum of five years plus the ratio of i) the lump sum of future minimum lease 
payments more than five years into the future (i.e., Thereafter Portion) divided by ii) the year t+5 
future minimum lease payment (Year 5 MLP) as in the formula below: 
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 =  5 +  
(𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 5 𝑀𝐿𝑃)
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This measure provides an indication of how many years into the future the firm has lease 
obligations. The Lease_term measure imposes a straight-line assumption into the calculation 
meaning that firms having a larger lump sum of lease obligations (i.e., the thereafter portion) 
relative to year 5 minimum lease payments are classified as having longer-term leases. I further 
assume that longer-term leases are more likely to have debt-like characteristics which lenders have 
greater incentive to capitalize.23 Thus, I predict a positive relation between Lease_term and 
Nongaap (i.e., β1 > 0). 
 The next set of tests examines additional measures of lease characteristics and the 
probability of capitalization into debt covenants:  
 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑃_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑_𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛
− 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(2)  
In this model, I measure lease characteristics following Altamuro et al. (2013). The authors find 
evidence that firms in the retail industry, firms with related party leases or leases with guaranteed 
residual value, and distressed firms have incremental explanatory power for loan interest rates. 
These measures provide proxies of lease characteristics to capture lenders’ incentives to adjust 
financial covenants. Altamuro et al. (2013) find evidence that operating leases of retail-industry 
firms resemble rentals (i.e., true leases). To proxy for leases that resemble rentals, I use an industry-
based indicator variable, Retail, for firms in the Fama-French 48 Retail Industry classification. If 
lenders selectively capitalize operating leases that are in substance closer to economic liabilities, I 
                                                 
23 If my proxy for synthetic leases is measured with error, I will be less likely to find an effect on lenders’ propensity 
to make non-GAAP adjustments because of attenuation bias. 
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expect that lenders are less likely to make adjustments for firms in the retail industry and predict a 
negative sign for β1.24  
 The next proxy, RP_resid_synth, captures lease characteristics that increase the likelihood 
that the bankruptcy court will recharacterize the lease from an operating lease to a security interest. 
Leases to related parties and leases with residual value guarantees are more likely to represent 
liabilities to the lessee and to be viewed as security interests by the bankruptcy court. In addition, 
leases characterized as synthetic leases are treated as security interests by the bankruptcy court. 
Synthetic leases represent a unique class of leases that are not distinguished separately from 
operating leases for financial reporting but have contract features that resemble economic 
liabilities such as balloon payments and residual value guarantees that leave the lessee ultimately 
responsible for the risks and rewards associated with asset ownership (Evans 1996). Moreover, 
synthetic lease financing arrangements require no down payments and require interest-only 
payments—thus, mechanical capitalization of the lease payments for these lease arrangements 
understates the future cash outflow due at the end of the synthetic lease term (Altamuro 2006; 
Zechman 2010). Bankruptcy court cases note a precedent of characterizing synthetic leases as 
security interests.25 Thus, synthetic leases represent instances in which lenders have incentive to 
monitor borrower leases by capitalizing operating leases. To measure related party leases, residual 
value guarantees leases, and synthetic leases, I search SEC filings using 10-K Wizard.26 Because 
related party, guaranteed residual value, and synthetic leases occur infrequently in the sample but 
have the same empirical prediction, I combine the measures into one variable RP_resid_synth 
                                                 
24 As noted above, I measure Retail using the Fama-French 48 industry classification. Using a finer classification 
scheme is a more conservative measure of firms in the retail industry. A broader industry classification would label 
more firms as retail firms and would likely bias in favor of finding an effect. 
25 Unocal Corp. v. Union Oil, 177 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.1061 (1999). 
26 I hand-collect data on synthetic leases from 10-K Wizard following (Zechman 2010) using the following search 
string: “synthetic leas∗” or “(residual w/10 guarantee) w/30 (operating leas∗ or rent∗).” 
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equal to one if a borrower discloses a related party, guaranteed residual value, or synthetic lease 
and zero otherwise.27 I expect a positive sign for β2 indicating that lenders are more likely to make 
non-GAAP adjustments when borrowers have leases with these attributes. 
 Finally, Altamuro et al. (2013) predict that lenders have greater incentive to account for 
operating leases when the borrower is distressed. To capture distressed borrowers, I calculate z-
scores for each four-digit SIC year during the sample period and define Distressed equal to one if 
the borrower has a z-score above the industry-year median and zero otherwise. The hypothesis 
predicts a positive sign for β3 indicating that lenders are more likely to make non-GAAP 
adjustments when firms are distressed.  
2.4  Sample Selection and Results 
2.4.1  Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 To select the sample, I begin with all deals in the Dealscan database. I limit the sample to 
completed deals denominated in U.S. Dollars that contain leverage, debt-to-earnings, fixed charge 
coverage, and interest coverage debt covenants as these covenants are most likely to be modified 
by lenders to include operating leases. I then merge the Dealscan data into Compustat for all firms 
with available gvkey matches.28 Using Compustat data on the disclosed future minimum lease 
payments relating to operating leases, I restrict the sample to firms having a ratio of present value 
of operating leases to total assets of 20 percent or greater.29 Isolating firms that have relatively 
                                                 
27 Combining the proxies into a single variable is consistent with the treatment of related party and residual value 
guarantee leases in Altamuro et al. (2013). 
28 Chava and Roberts (2008) provide the linking table for the Dealscan-Compustat matching. Additionally, I screen 
Compustat data for firms headquartered in the U.S. (‘fic’ = ‘USA’) and with positive values of total assets (‘at’>0). 
29 Disclosure guidance according to SFAS 13 requires firms to list aggregate future minimum lease payments of all 
operating leases for the next five years, then a lump sum of such payments for all years thereafter. Compustat 
collects these data and labels them “mrc1” – “mrc5” and “mrcta” for the five years of future minimum lease 
payments and the thereafter portion, respectively. To calculate a present value amount of the operating leases, I use a 
10 percent discount rate consistent with prior research (Ge 2006) and credit rating practices (Moody’s Investor 
Service). 
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large amounts of operating leases provides a sample where off-balance-sheet leases play a 
significant role in the financing of the firm and are most likely to affect contracting incentives. In 
other words, if lenders make any adjustments for operating leases, I expect the adjustments to be 
most prevalent in firms with a significant amount of operating leases.  
 Using these sample selection criteria, I hand collect all available lending agreements from 
2008 to 2011. This sample period is well suited to providing evidence about how lenders 
distinguish among operating leases. First, the leasing industry has evolved since the passage of 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 13: Accounting for Leases (SFAS 13). It is widely 
cited both in academic literature and among practitioners that firms structure transactions to 
achieve operating-lease financial reporting. Second, operating leases have not only become more 
prevalent but they have also become more complex (e.g., Imhoff Jr., Lipe, and Wright 1991; 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2005). For example, the innovation of synthetic 
leases, which are reported as operating leases, are specially structured leases involving special-
purpose entities and specific contractual terms to meet operating lease requirements for financial 
reporting while concurrently meeting tax requirements to classify the transaction as a capital lease 
for tax purposes to provide the lessee with an additional tax shield. A recent sample is beneficial 
in informing standard setters whether current contracting practices treat operating leases equally. 
Based on the sample selection criteria, the final sample of firms with available firm-level and 
contract-level data is 111 lending agreements. 
Table 1 reports time, industry, and covenant distributions for the sample contracts and 
firms. Panel A documents that the distribution of contracts by year is relatively stable across time. 
Panel B highlights the industry concentration of my sample firms particularly in the retail industry 
with 60 percent of sample firms classified as retailers which is consistent with prior lease 
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accounting studies. Finally, Panel C tabulates the distribution of covenants types. Lenders 
capitalize operating leases into two types of covenants: leverage covenants and debt-to-earnings 
covenants. Leverage covenants occur in 16 percent of the sample and debt-to-earnings covenants 
occur in 84 percent of the sample.30 Lenders capitalize operating leases in 36 percent of leverage 
covenants and 71 percent of debt-to-earnings ratios, and there are no instances in which lenders 
adjust for operating leases in both covenants simultaneously. Within each covenant type and for 
the sample overall, lenders exhibit variation in the degree to which they incorporate leases into 
financial covenants. 
Table 2 displays sample descriptive statistics. Beginning with summary statistics presented 
in Panel A I note that of the available sample contracts, 40 percent contain covenant definitions 
that capitalize operating leases. This provides initial evidence of the degree of variation in the 
contractual treatment of operating leases. I also note that borrower use of operating leases differs 
along multiple dimensions. First, the average number of years of minimum lease payments ranges 
from 5 to 21 years with an average of 8.75 years. Additionally, the present value of future minimum 
lease payments relative to total assets varies from 22 percent of assets to 342 percent of assets with 
an average of 56 percent. These sample descriptive statistics are consistent with practice and 
findings from other studies indicating diversity in how extensively firms utilize leasing as a form 
of financing. The economic significance of sample operating leases is expected given the sample 
selection criteria but underscores the extent of lease financing in the sample. Finally, borrowers 
exhibit some degree of variation in terms of related party leases, leases with residual value 
                                                 
30 Li (2010) and Demerjian (2011) report debt-to-earnings (or debt-to-cash flow) ratios in roughly fifty percent of 
their sample contracts. The nature of my sample selection criteria likely contribute to the high concentration of debt-
to-earnings ratios in my sample. 
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guarantees, and synthetic leases with 11 percent of sample contracts exhibiting leases with these 
attributes.31 
Panel B provides Spearman correlations for variables used in the multivariate analyses. I turn 
first to the variables used to test the hypotheses. The first variable of interest, Lease_term is 
positively correlated with non-GAAP adjustments as predicted in H1 and in untabulated analysis 
is significant at the five-percent level. Retail and RP_res_syn are also correlated with the 
dependent variable in the hypothesized direction, although the correlation is weaker. Distress 
exhibits a negative correlation in contrast to the expected positive sign. 
2.4.2  Results 
To provide evidence on H1, I estimate Equation (1) using a probit model. The first column 
displays coefficient estimates for the model using the Lease_term variable while the second 
column displays estimates using the log of Lease_term. The t-statistics in brackets are calculated 
using robust standard errors. Both specifications show a positive and significant coefficient on 
Lease_term and the log of Lease_term consistent with the predictions of H1. The results indicate 
that lenders are significantly more likely to capitalize operating leases when lending to borrowers 
with leases of longer duration. These findings suggest that operating lease characteristics affect 
the incentives lenders face when writing financial covenants. The negative sign on Lease_intensity 
indicates a lower probability of adjusting for operating leases when the present value of future 
minimum lease payments is higher on average. A positive relation would indicate a linear relation 
between operating lease intensity and contract adjustment consistent with a uniform treatment of 
                                                 
31 Individually, related party, residual value guarantee, and synthetic leases occur less frequently. I aggregate these 
lease types into a single variable as they have the same directional prediction on lenders’ incentives. Related party 
leases, residual value guarantees, and synthetic leases are all more likely to be characterized in bankruptcy as 
security interests with the result that lenders’ recovery rates decline. Thus, the prediction is that these lease types are 
associated with an increased probability of capitalizing operating leases into financial covenant definitions. 
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operating leases (i.e., the more operating leases a borrower has, the more likely the lender is to 
capitalize those leases into debt covenants). In contrast to a uniform treatment, the negative relation 
for Lease_intensity in conjunction with the positive relation for Lease_term suggests that lenders 
consider lease terms in addition to the levels of operating leases when choosing how to define debt 
covenants. The results underscore the idea that uniformly capitalizing operating leases into debt 
covenants is not always in lenders’ best interest.  
In addition to these findings, the results also indicate that lenders are more likely to make 
non-GAAP adjustments when borrowers have more physical assets and negative ROA. Lessors 
are likely to have security interests in a lessee’s non-leased assets which threatens lenders’ 
bankruptcy priority. The negative coefficient on Roa is also consistent with lenders have greater 
incentive to incorporate operating leases to protect against an increased risk of bankruptcy when 
borrowers experience negative ROA. 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation 2. As in Table 1, I estimate the model using a 
probit specification with t-statistics calculated based on robust standard errors. This table reports 
coefficient estimates for three additional proxies of lease characteristics. In the first column, 
Retail has a negative coefficient but is not statistically different from zero. The negative 
coefficient indicates that contracts are less likely to include non-GAAP adjustments when 
borrowers are in the retail industry. Similarly, RP_resid_synth and Distress have coefficients in 
the predicted direction but are not significantly different from zero. The lack of statistical 
significance may indicate no effect of these variables on non-GAAP adjustments, a lack of 
power due to the small sample size, or noisy measures of lease characteristics. The remaining 
control variables have signs and magnitudes relatively consistent with Table 3 with the exception 
of Lease_intensity, which is no longer significant. Overall, the results from these analyses 
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indicate an association between lease characteristics and lenders’ propensity to capitalize 
operating leases when defining debt covenants. 
2.5  Conclusion 
This paper examines the relation between borrowers’ operating lease characteristics and 
lenders’ propensity to capitalize operating leases in debt covenants. The purpose of studying this 
relation is to determine whether lenders treat operating leases equally for contracting purposes. 
The recent lease accounting exposure drafts from the joint FASB-IASB leasing project provide for 
balance-sheet treatment of substantially all leases. I argue that bankruptcy laws relating to leases 
affect lenders’ ability to recover principal in bankruptcy proceedings and that these potential costs 
are related to variation in borrower lease characteristics. Thus, borrower lease characteristics affect 
lenders contracting incentives and are associated with differential treatment of operating leases as 
opposed to a “one-size-fits-all” contracting treatment of operating leases.  
Using a hand-collected sample of lending agreements from 2008 to 2011, I find that lenders are 
significantly more likely to capitalize operating leases when borrower leases have longer lease 
terms. In addition to borrower lease term, I investigate other lease characteristics including 
related party, residual value guarantee, and synthetic leases and document no significant relations 
with lenders’ propensity to adjust covenants and these lease characteristics. Overall, the analyses 
provide modest evidence that lenders tailor debt covenant definitions according to borrowers’ 
operating lease characteristics. This study is relevant to standard setters by documenting variable 
treatment of operating leases in the debt contracting setting and providing an explanation of how 
bankruptcy costs affect lenders’ incentives for capitalizing operating leases. 
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Appendix 2.1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
NONGAAP 
Indicator variable equal to one if a contract 
modifies GAAP definitions with respect to lease 
accounting and zero otherwise. 
Hand Collection 
Lease_term 
Thereafter portion of future minimum lease 
payments (mrcta) divided by year 5 future 
minimum lease payments (mrc5) or year 4 future 
minimum lease payments if year 5 is a missing 
value (mrc4) (following Altamuro et al. (2013). 
Compustat 
Retail 
Indicator variable equal to one if a firm is in a 
Retail industry as defined by the Fama-French 48 
industry classification and zero otherwise. 
Compustat 
RP_resid_synth 
Indicator variable equal ot one if a firm discloses 
related party leases, residual value guarantees, or 
synthetic leases in 10-K filings in the fiscal year 
prior to loan initiation and zero otherwise. I use 
search strings from Altamuro et al. (2013) to 
identify related party and residual value leases 
and Zechman (2010) to identify synthetic leases. 
Hand Collection 
Distress 
Indicator variable equal to one if firm is above 
the median Altman z-score for the pooled sample 
of firms and zero otherwise. Altman z-score 
follows standard calculation based on prior 
literature. 
Compustat 
Lease_intensity 
Equal to the present value of disclosed future 
minimum lease payments for operating leases 
following Ge (2006) modified to include the 
thereafter portion (mrcta). 
Compustat 
Spread 
Equal to the log of the package-level mean of the 
maximum basis points identified in Dealscan's 
pricing dataset. 
Dealscan 
Deal_amount Log of loan principal amount. Dealscan 
Maturity Log of debt maturity in months. Dealscan 
PP 
Indicator variable equal to one if a contract 
contains a performance pricing provision and 
zero otherwise. 
Dealscan 
Collateral 
Indicator variable equal to one if a contract 
requires collateral and zero otherwise. 
Dealscan 
MVE 
Common shares outstanding (csho) multiplied by 
end of year stock price (prcc_f). 
Compustat 
BM 
Book value of equity (seq) divided by market 
value of equity (csho*prcc_f) 
Compustat 
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Variable Definition Data Source 
Leverage 
Total debt (dltt+dlc) divided by total debt 
(dltt+dlc) plus book value of equity (seq) plus 
minority interest (mib) 
Compustat 
Tangibility Net PP&E (ppent) divided by total assets (at). Compustat 
Roa 
Earnings before extraordinary items (ib) divided 
by total assets (at). 
Compustat 
Loss 
Indicator variable equal to one if a borrower has 
negative earnings before extraordinary items in the 
fiscal year prior to loan initiation and zero 
otherwise. 
Compustat 
Index_returns 
Equal to 12-month CRSP value-weighted index 
returns from one year prior to contract initiation to 
the date of contract initiation. 
CRSP 
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Table 2.1 
Time, Industry, and Covenant Distributions 
Panel A: Loan Contracts by 
Year           
Year   # Contracts % Contracts     
2008   32 28.8%     
2009   20 18.0%     
2010   23 20.7%     
2011   36 32.4%     
Total   111 100.0%     
            
Panel B: Firm Observations by Industry (Fama-French 10)     
Industry Group   # Firms % Firms     
Durables   1 1.1%     
HiTec   3 3.3%     
Healthcare   4 4.4%     
Manuf   1 1.1%     
NonDurables   6 6.6%     
Other   21 23.1%     
Shops   54 59.3%     
Telecom   1 1.1%     
Total   91 100.0%     
            
Panel C: Distribution of Financial Covenants and Non-GAAP Adjustments 
Covenant Type   
Covenant 
Freq. % Sample 
Non-GAAP 
Adj. Freq. 
%  
Covenant 
Leverage   11 16.4% 4 36.4% 
Debt-To-Earnings   56 83.6% 40 71.4% 
Total   67 100.0% 44   
            
            
Table 2.1 presents sample distributions across time, industries, and covenant types for the 
sample used to test non-GAAP covenant adjustments for operating leases. Panel A displays 
the distribution of loan contracts by year. Panel B displays industry distributions for firms 
using the Fama-French 10 industry classification. Panel C displays the distribution of 
covenant types and the frequency with which lenders capitalize operating leases within each 
covenant type. 
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TABLE 2.2 
Sample Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
                      
  Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max   
  Nongaap 111 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00   
  Lease_term 111 8.75 2.96 5.00 6.90 8.01 9.76 21.41   
  Retail 111 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00   
  RP_resid_synth 111 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00   
  Distress 111 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00   
  Lease_intensity 111 0.56 0.45 0.22 0.35 0.47 0.61 3.42   
  Spread 111 5.12 0.77 2.81 4.83 5.16 5.62 6.55   
  Deal_amount 111 302.34 430.84 6.00 60.00 150.00 380.00 3000.00   
  Maturity 111 
                
45.58  
                
16.58  
                  
4.93  
                
36.03  
                
48.03  
                
60.03  
                
67.27    
  PP 111 0.62 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00   
  Collateral 111 0.68 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00   
  MVE 111 2290.07 4121.89 17.17 171.87 662.53 2114.75 19096.73   
  BM 111 0.76 0.72 0.06 0.30 0.52 1.07 3.75   
  Leverage 111 0.54 0.20 0.17 0.37 0.52 0.70 0.97   
  Tangibility 111 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.24 0.32 0.50 0.86   
  Roa 111 0.03 0.14 -0.43 -0.02 0.06 0.10 0.34   
  Loss 111 0.29 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00   
  Index_returns 111 0.06 0.26 -0.44 -0.09 0.06 0.20 0.58   
                      
                      
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics and correlations for the sample used to test non-GAAP covenant adjustments for operating lease activity. Panel A 
presents summary statistics and Panel B presents Spearman correlations. The summary statistics and correlations are for the sample of lending agreements 
collected from 2008 - 2011. *Significant at the one-percent level. See APPENDIX 2.1 for variable definitions. 
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Panel B: Spearman Correlations 
                                        
      (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Nongaap   0.24 -0.12 0.07 -0.18 0.09 -0.28* 0.12 0.13 0.18 -0.34* 0.14 -0.25* -0.07 0.32* 0.16 -0.19 0.07 
(2) Log(Lease_term)   -0.23 0.11 0.03 0.31* 0.14 -0.11 -0.02 0.12 0.02 0.07 -0.12 0.12 0.38* -0.04 0.04 -0.13 
(3) Retail       -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.29* -0.23 -0.09 0.09 -0.21 0.35* 0.11 -0.20 -0.22 0.13 -0.15 -0.14 
(4) RP_resid_synth       -0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.16 0.00 
(5) Distress           -0.05 0.44* -0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.42* -0.25* 0.26* 0.21 -0.12 -0.37* 0.37* 0.03 
(6) Lease_intensity           -0.07 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.09 -0.20 0.05 0.03 0.12 -0.12 0.04 -0.12 
(7) Spread               -0.05 -0.14 -0.19 0.41* -0.38* 0.33* 0.41* -0.04 -0.46* 0.49* 0.00 
(8) Log(Deal_amount)               0.26* 0.11 0.17 -0.34* -0.10 0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.11 0.04 
(9) Maturity                   -0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.17 
(10) PP                     -0.06 0.10 -0.03 -0.19 0.08 0.07 -0.20 -0.19 
(11) Collateral                       -0.52* 0.36* 0.04 -0.13 -0.41* 0.36* -0.11 
(12) Log(MVE)                       -0.52* 0.01 0.08 0.58* -0.42* 0.02 
(13) BM                           -0.33* -0.21 -0.69* 0.46* -0.19 
(14) Leverage                             0.12 -0.07 0.22 0.15 
(15) Tangibility                             -0.03 0.07 0.02 
(16) Roa                                 -0.78* 0.14 
(17) Loss                                   -0.06 
(18) Index_returns                                   
                                        
                                        
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics and correlations for the sample used to test non-GAAP covenant adjustments for operating lease activity. Panel A presents 
summary statistics and Panel B presents Spearman correlations. The summary statistics and correlations are for the sample of lending agreements collected from 
2008 - 2011. *Significant at the one-percent level. See APPENDIX 2.1 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 2.3 
Non-GAAP Lease Covenant Analysis: Lease Term 
            
Variable Pred Nongaap   Nongaap   
            
Lease_term + 0.1783***       
    [2.78]       
            
Log(Lease_term) +     1.5154**   
        [2.42]   
            
Lease_intensity   -1.0409**   -0.8913**   
    [-2.43]   [-2.24]   
            
Spread   -0.2751   -0.2696   
    [-1.16]   [-1.13]   
            
Loan_size   1.6860**   1.6004*   
    [2.02]   [1.91]   
            
Mature   -0.2552   -0.2565   
    [-1.01]   [-1.02]   
            
PP   0.1078   0.091   
    [0.35]   [0.29]   
            
Collateral   -0.8742**   -0.8936**   
    [-2.37]   [-2.41]   
            
Size   -0.1055   -0.1169   
    [-0.71]   [-0.77]   
            
BM   -0.4499   -0.4492   
    [-1.17]   [-1.18]   
            
Leverage   -1.1073   -1.0488   
    [-1.20]   [-1.15]   
            
Tangibility   2.4244***   2.4138***   
    [2.80]   [2.81]   
 
[69] 
 
            
Variable Pred Nongaap   Nongaap   
            
Roa   -2.8969*   -2.8544*   
    [-1.78]   [-1.77]   
            
Loss   -0.8005   -0.8383   
    [-1.51]   [-1.59]   
            
Index_returns   0.831   0.8608   
    [1.41]   [1.46]   
            
Constant   2.0594   0.3826   
    [1.05]   [0.18]   
            
N   111   111   
Pseudo R-Squared   32.73%   32.16%   
            
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
            
Table 2.3 presents coefficient estimates from a probit model estimating Equation (1) for the 
sample of lending agreements collected from 2008 - 2011. The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if lenders capitalize operating leases (i.e., Nongaap) and zero otherwise. 
The main variable of interest, Lease_term, equals five plus the ratio of the "thereafter" portion 
of disclosed future minimum lease payments divided by the year five future minimum lease 
payments. See APPENDIX 2.1 for detailed definitions of the remaining variables. 
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TABLE 2.4 
Non-GAAP Lease Covenant Analysis: Industry, Lease, and Lessee Characteristics 
                
Variable Pred Nongaap   Nongaap   Nongaap   
                
Retail - -0.3744           
    [-1.16]           
                
RP_resid_synth +     0.3789       
        [0.80]       
                
Distress +         0.1784   
            [0.52]   
                
Lease_intensity   -0.2892   -0.3089   -0.2536   
    [-0.94]   [-1.03]   [-0.82]   
                
Spread   -0.2097   -0.1714   -0.1757   
    [-0.88]   [-0.72]   [-0.73]   
                
Loan_size   1.5179*   1.6180*   1.6497*   
    [1.80]   [1.95]   [1.92]   
                
Mature   -0.3122   -0.3123   -0.2972   
    [-1.22]   [-1.22]   [-1.11]   
                
PP   0.2309   0.197   0.2111   
    [0.75]   [0.65]   [0.69]   
                
Collateral   -0.9418***   -0.9432***   -0.9491**   
    [-2.61]   [-2.70]   [-2.41]   
                
Size   -0.0356   -0.0841   -0.0585   
    [-0.25]   [-0.59]   [-0.42]   
                
BM   -0.3587   -0.4484   -0.4305   
    [-0.99]   [-1.19]   [-1.20]   
                
Leverage   -0.9601   -0.9434   -0.9917   
    [-1.07]   [-1.02]   [-1.12]   
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Variable Pred Nongaap   Nongaap   Nongaap   
                
Tangibility   2.7515***   2.9423***   2.9895***   
    [3.31]   [3.61]   [3.77]   
                
Roa   -2.8042*   -2.6071*   -2.7959*   
    [-1.81]   [-1.66]   [-1.81]   
                
Loss   -0.8014   -0.6927   -0.8106   
    [-1.48]   [-1.31]   [-1.55]   
                
Index_returns   0.5938   0.6494   0.6413   
    [1.06]   [1.17]   [1.16]   
                
Constant   2.5342   2.3949   2.1575   
    [1.32]   [1.23]   [1.10]   
                
                
N   111   111   111   
Pseudo R-Squared   29.74%   29.43%   29.18%   
                
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in 
parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
                
Table 2.4 presents coefficient estimates from a probit model estimating Equation (2) for the 
sample of lending agreements collected from 2008 - 2011. The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if lenders capitalize operating leases (i.e., Nongaap) and zero otherwise. 
The main variables of interest are Retail, an indicator equal to one for borrowers classified as 
retail firms according to the Fama-French 48 industry classification and zero otherwise; 
RP_resid_synth, an indicator equal to one if the borrower discloses related party, residual 
value guarantee, or synthetic leases in 10-K filings in the fiscal year preceding contract 
initiation and zero otherwise; and Distress, an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower's 
z-score is below the four-digit SIC industry median z-score value and zero otherwise. See 
APPENDIX 2.1 for detailed definitions of the remaining variables. 
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Chapter 3: Do Cross-Country Differences in 
Accounting Standards Affect the Costs of 
Contracting? 
3.1 Introduction 
 This paper studies whether differences in accounting standards across countries affect 
lenders’ costs of contracting. I investigate the relation between accounting standards required in 
private debt agreements and lenders’ country of domicile and how this relation varies with the 
number of accounting rule differences between borrower-country and lender-country accounting 
standards. I also examine loan spread, maturity, and financial covenant use when contract-
specified accounting standards match lender-country accounting standards. I argue that accounting 
standard differences increase lenders’ costs of performing due diligence to screen potential 
borrowers and increase lenders’ costs of defining financial covenants at loan inception. Studying 
the above relations provides evidence of how variation in global accounting standards influences 
debt contracting terms. 
 Prior studies document that differences in accounting standards across countries are 
correlated with cross-border equity investment decisions (see, e.g., Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller 
2004; Covrig, Defond, and Hung 2007; Francis, Huang, and Khurana 2014; Yu and Wahid 2014). 
The findings from these studies suggest that equity investors incur costs to acquire and process 
information when evaluating firms that report financial information according to accounting 
principles that differ from investors’ home countries. The findings also suggest that conformity to 
US accounting principles, voluntary adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS), and 
the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) reduces the cost of 
foreign investment.  
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 Little evidence exists, however, regarding accounting standard differences and debt-market 
participants. While lenders have a payoff structure that differs from equity investors and are 
concerned with evaluating the net assets of borrowers, they acquire and process financial 
information to make loan decisions (Watts 2003). Private lenders expend effort to screen out 
borrowers that are not creditworthy and to set loan terms including financial covenants, and these 
activities make use of firm financial information. I argue that lenders incur incremental costs to 
translate financial results from borrower accounting standards to lender accounting standards when 
screening potential foreign borrowers and to incorporate the implications of these differences when 
negotiating financial covenants. Lenders must account for these “translation costs” when making 
loan decisions and drafting loan terms.32 
 To examine how accounting standard differences affect lenders’ contracting behavior, I 
hand-collect a sample of 215 private debt agreements from cross-listed foreign firms available in 
SEC filings during the period from 1994 to 2012 and determine the set of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) specified in each contract (e.g., US GAAP, UK GAAP, or IFRS). 
I first examine the relation between contract-specified accounting principles and the lender country 
of domicile in a probit regression where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the 
debt contract specifies US GAAP as the set of accounting principles used for contracting purposes 
(i.e., debt covenant compliance).33 The primary explanatory variable is whether a contract is 
originated by a lending office domiciled in the US (based on the lending office address specified 
in the debt agreement). This relation is designed to test the hypothesis that lenders face costs of 
evaluating potential borrowers that report financial information based on accounting standards that 
                                                 
32 While accounting standard differences likely affect both the loan decision and negotiating loan terms, I do not 
attempt to measure these constructs separately given a lack of data on loan approvals or rejections. 
33 The key variables of interest remain statistically significant when estimating the models using logistic regressions. 
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differ from the accounting standards most commonly used in the lender’s home country. The extent 
of these costs determines whether lenders extend loans to borrowers reporting different GAAP and 
whether debt covenants are based on lender-country GAAP or borrower-reported GAAP. The 
results of the probit analyses indicate that US lenders are significantly more likely to use US GAAP 
as the basis for contracting. This finding suggests that the incremental translation costs drive a 
lender preference for accounting standards that are consistent with the lender’s country of 
domicile. To corroborate these findings, I estimate models using Canadian GAAP, UK GAAP, 
and IFRS as dependent variables and Canadian lenders, UK lenders, and IFRS-country lenders as 
explanatory variables.34 Similar to the findings from US lenders, the analyses indicate that 
contracts are significantly more likely to specify accounting standards that are consistent with 
accounting standards prevalent in the lender’s country (after controlling for same-country loans). 
Overall, the results indicate that accounting standard differences are costly to lenders and that 
lenders prefer their home-country accounting standards for contracting purposes. 
 I next examine whether the degree of differences between borrower-reported accounting 
standards and lender-country accounting standards affects lenders’ contracting costs. I argue that 
lender costs of “translating” from borrower-country to lender-country accounting standards are 
increasing in the extent of divergence of accounting standards between two countries. As 
borrower- and lender-country accounting standards diverge, lenders exert even greater effort and 
cost to learn borrower-country GAAP and understand the contracting implications of the 
accounting differences (e.g., how borrower-country GAAP correlates with borrower credit risk 
                                                 
34 I select UK, Canadian, and IFRS-country lenders for additional tests because they represent the largest 
proportions of lender countries outside of the US in the sample. These three countries comprise 31 percent, 16 
percent, and 20 percent of sample observations, respectively. The remaining lender countries individually comprise 
10 percent or less of the sample (see Table 1 Panel C).  
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and to what extent the lender must modify the borrower accounting principles to derive metrics 
for monitoring).35  
 To test this hypothesis, I estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if the debt contract specifies US accounting standards and zero otherwise. I 
measure accounting standard differences between borrower-lender country pairs following Bae, 
Tan, and Welker (2008).36 Interacting this measure with an indicator for lenders domiciled in the 
US (US Lender) captures how lenders’ preference for their home-country accounting standards 
varies with the degree to which borrowers’ accounting principles differ from US GAAP. I find no 
statistical evidence that the degree of accounting standard differences impacts the likelihood that 
US lenders contract on US GAAP.  
 Finally, I investigate how loan terms vary when the contract-specified accounting standards 
are consistent with the lender’s home country accounting standards. I argue that lenders reduce 
contracting costs when accounting standards required in the loan agreement are the same as 
accounting standards prevalent in the lender’s country of domicile. Moreover, lenders provide 
more favorable loan terms under these circumstances. To test this hypothesis, I estimate least 
squares regressions where the dependent variables are loan spread, maturity, and number of 
financial covenants used and the primary explanatory variable of interest is the interaction of an 
indicator for contracts specifying US GAAP and an indicator for US-domiciled lenders. The 
                                                 
35 I argue that lenders’ costs of translating from one set of accounting standards to another are increasing in the 
extent of accounting differences. Lenders may require borrowers to base covenant compliance on a second set of 
accounting standards that coincide with the lenders’ country of domicile. However, borrowers bear costs of 
converting from borrower-country to lender-country accounting standards. In the absence of theory regarding the 
costs borrowers and lenders face when confronted with another set of accounting standards, I am unable to make 
predictions about circumstances in which contracting costs are minimized by borrowers converting versus lenders 
translating from one set of standards to another. 
36 Borrowers listed on sample loan contracts are often subsidiaries of the cross-listed firm. I employ the Bae, Tan, 
and Welker (2008) measure (BTW) at the parent-company level (i.e., cross-listed firm) because subsidiaries likely 
provide accounting reports based on the parent-company reporting standards as part of consolidation. Additionally, I 
lose fewer contracts when applying the BTW measure to the parent versus subsidiary firms.   
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hypothesis predicts that when US lenders contract using US accounting standards, lenders provide 
more favorable loan terms with lower loan spreads, longer maturities, and fewer financial 
covenants. The regression results indicate no significant relation between loan spreads, maturity, 
and financial covenant use for contracts underwritten by US lenders and specifying US GAAP. 
The absence of a significant relation could indicate a low-power sample due to the small sample 
size. Alternatively, the lack of findings may suggest that while lenders prefer contracting on the 
accounting standards of their home country, contracted accounting standards are not of first-order 
importance to warrant a modification of other contract terms.  
   This paper contributes to extant research on two main fronts. First, this study relates to 
research investigating the extent to which differences among existing accounting standards affect 
the costs of information acquisition and processing activities of capital market participants. Prior 
studies investigate how accounting standard differences affect institutional investment (Bradshaw 
et al. 2004), equity analysts (Bae et al. 2008), foreign mutual fund investment (see, e.g., Covrig et 
al. 2007; DeFond et al. 2011; Yu and Wahid 2014), and cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(Francis, Huang, and Khurana 2014). My paper complements this research with evidence from 
credit-market participants. Despite private lenders having access to inside information for 
screening and negotiating contract terms at the outset of a loan, the findings suggest that private 
lenders prefer contracting on GAAP from their country of domicile consistent with GAAP 
differences increasing lenders’ contracting costs. 
 Second, this study is related to prior papers investigating how changes in international 
accounting standards affect contracting outcomes. Recent studies provide evidence of how IFRS 
adoption affects the ability of accounting information to predict credit ratings and how private 
lenders structure credit agreements (see, e.g., Florou, Kosi, and Pope (2012), Chen, Chin, Wang, 
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Yao (2013), Florou and Kosi (2013), Ball, Li, and Shivakumar (2013)). Rather than focusing on 
a single accounting standard change, my study provides evidence more broadly regarding cross-
country variation in accounting standards and how differences in accounting standards affects 
lenders’ contracting incentives. Additionally, my study provides unique descriptive evidence of 
the variation in contract-specified accounting standards of cross-listed firms. 
3.2  Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1  Accounting Standard Differences and Contracting Costs 
 The first research question investigates how cross-country accounting standard differences 
relate to lenders’ contracting costs. Prior studies examine how accounting standard differences and 
voluntary and mandatory accounting changes affect cross-border investment. These papers argue 
that investors exert less time and effort to acquire and process information when investing in firms 
that report financial information according to accounting rules that comply more closely with US 
standards (Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller 2004), when firms voluntarily adopt International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) (Covrig, Defond, and Hung 2007), when IFRS adoption results in 
greater comparability with industry peers (DeFond, Hu, Hung, and Li 2011), and when the 
differences in accounting standards between investors and investees is smaller (Yu and Wahid 
2014). The findings from these prior studies suggest that changes in financial reporting practices 
and accounting standard differences affect the costs of foreign investment. These studies relate 
specifically to equity investors. Although debt investors have differing payoffs from equity 
investors, debt investors acquire and process financial information when considering potential 
borrowers and designing the lending agreement including financial covenant definitions. These 
efforts are complicated when accounting standards of potential borrowers differ from accounting 
standards in a lender’s country of domicile. For example, lenders must exert additional time and 
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effort to translate financial results from borrower GAAP to lender-country GAAP when 
performing due diligence. Additionally, when borrower and lender-country accounting standards 
differ, lenders expend effort to incorporate accounting standard differences into debt covenant 
definitions. Thus, lenders bear costs of contracting on accounting standards that differ from their 
standard practice that include learning and understanding the contracting implications of an 
alternative set of accounting standards. Because accounting standards affect contracting costs, 
lenders are likely to exhibit a preference for contracting on accounting standards that coincide with 
the prevalent accounting standards of their home countries: 
H1: Lenders domiciled in the US are more likely to contract on US accounting standards 
than foreign accounting standards. 
  While the arguments support the prediction that lenders minimize contracting costs by 
contracting on accounting standards consistent with their home country, it is not immediately 
obvious that financial reporting affects lenders’ ability to gather and process information. Prior 
literature notes that single lenders and lead arrangers in syndicate arrangements have access to 
inside information about the firm (see, e.g., Fama (1985), Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008), 
Nikolaev (2010)). Private information about a borrower could substitute for accounting 
information from financial reporting. Moreover, recent findings suggest that banks modify GAAP 
when writing debt covenants (Li 2010); thus, lenders may tailor accounting rulers regardless of 
the set of standards used. Hence, it is not a foregone conclusion that differences in accounting 
standards affect lenders’ costs of contracting. 
 I expect that lenders’ translation costs from borrower to lender accounting standards vary 
with the degree of differences between lender-country and borrower-country accounting standards. 
As the number of accounting-rule differences between lender and borrower GAAP increase, 
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lenders exert even greater effort to learn the alternate accounting rules of the borrower. This 
argument suggests that lenders may avoid the translation costs by requiring the borrower to report 
a second set of financial statements. As accounting standard differences increase, lenders have a 
greater aversion for the translation costs and are more likely to require the borrower to provide 
financial statements and assess covenant compliance using lender-country accounting standards 
(i.e., suggesting a positive relation between accounting standard differences and contract-specified 
accounting standards). However, requiring a second set of financial statements places a burden on 
the borrower who may negotiate against supplying a second set of books (i.e., suggesting a 
negative relation between accounting standard differences and contract-specified accounting 
standards). The net effect of these opposing costs is an empirical question:37 
H2: US lenders are even more likely to contract on US accounting standards when the 
differences between borrower and lender accounting standards are greater. 
3.2.2  Effect of Accounting Standard Differences on Other Contracting 
Features 
 I next consider how accounting standard differences are correlated with other contractual 
features. Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber (2002) study the relation between loan spreads and voluntary 
and mandatory accounting change exclusions. The authors find evidence suggesting that borrowers 
pay higher spreads to maintain flexibility in accounting standards. If lenders face large translation 
costs given accounting standard differences, lenders may be willing to provide incentive for 
borrowers to incur the cost to produce financial statements that match the lender’s country. If 
                                                 
37 If accounting standard differences between borrowers and lenders are sufficiently large, the translation costs may 
be prohibitively high. Rather than imposing the requirement to provide a second set of financial statements on the 
borrower, the lender may choose not to lend to borrowers with different accounting standards and select potential 
borrowers who already follow accounting standards consistent with the lender’s home country. Given a lack of data 
on loan acceptance or denial, I cannot rule out this alternative explanation. 
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lenders reduce contracting costs by contracting on home-country accounting standards, lenders 
may offer borrowers more favorable loan terms including lower rates, longer maturities, or fewer 
financial covenants:  
H3: When US lenders contract on US accounting standards, the loan will contain lower 
interest rates, longer maturities, and fewer financial covenants. 
3.3  Research Design 
 To test the first hypothesis, I model lender preference for US accounting principles used 
for debt covenants in the following equation: 
 USGAAP     = α0 + α1US_Lender + ∑αiCountry-specific controls + ∑αiDebt-specific controls + 
∑αiBorrower-specific controls + e 
(1)    
 
where the dependent variable, USGAAP is an indicator variable equal to one when accounting 
principles specified in the lending agreement are US GAAP and zero otherwise. The main 
explanatory variable of interest is US_Lender, an indicator variable equal to one if the lending 
office is located in the US and zero otherwise. I predict that lenders contract on accounting 
standards consistent with the standards of their country of domicile. In other words, US lenders 
contract on US GAAP (𝛼1 > 0). 
 At the country level, I control for the strength of the borrower’s home country rule of law, 
RuleLaw, based on the index from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). At the firm level, 
lenders’ preference for US GAAP is likely to be mitigated when a quality audit is performed on 
the accounting information to ensure sufficient reliability for contracting activities. I proxy for 
audit quality using BigN, an indicator for Big 4 or Big 5 auditors as applicable during the sample 
period. Additionally, lenders’ incentives to choose GAAP used for financial covenant compliance 
are likely affected by various sources of agency costs. For example, poorly-performing firms, firms 
[81] 
 
experiencing losses, and firms with fewer tangible assets represent a higher risk to lenders. To 
control for potential sources of agency costs, I include proxies for loan and borrower characteristics 
that prior literature identifies as being correlated with lenders’ contracting incentives. To mitigate 
the effect of outliers, I winsorize continuous variables at the 1- and 99-percent levels. 
  To test the second hypothesis relating to differences in accounting principles, I augment 
Equation 1 with a measure of differences between borrower-reported GAAP and US GAAP in 
Equation 2: 
USGAAP    = β0 + β1Btw + β2US_Lender + β3Btw*US_Lender +  ∑βiCountry-specific controls + 
∑βiDebt-specific controls + ∑βiBorrower-specific controls + e 
(2)    
where the dependent variable, USGAAP, is defined as in Equation 1. I proxy for differences in 
financial reporting standards between borrower and lender countries using the variable Btw 
following Bae et al. (2008). Bae et al. (2008) measure differences in accounting standards by 
comparing countries’ domestic GAAP to International Accounting Standards (IAS) based on data 
from 2001 across 21 accounting rules. The measure is based on borrower-lender country pairs. If 
both countries in a pair are similar to or differ from IAS along a given dimension, the country pair 
is coded as having similar standards (i.e., given a value of 0). If one of the two countries in the pair 
differs from IAS, the country pair is coded as having dissimilar accounting standards (i.e., given a 
value of 1). The measure then sums the number of differences between the country pair across the 
21 accounting rules. An ideal measure would provide annual comparisons across sample years; 
however, the authors’ measure represents the most recently available data of this kind and is the 
best available proxy used in other international studies (see, e.g., Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 
(2013), Ball, Li, and Shivakumar (2013)). The primary measure of interest is the interaction of Btw 
and US_Lender (β3). The hypothesis predicts that contracts are more likely to specify US GAAP 
for contracting when borrower financial reporting differs to a greater extent from lender-country 
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accounting standards (i.e., β3 > 0). Country, loan, and borrower controls are measured similarly to 
Equation 1. 
 Equation 3 models how contract-specified accounting standards affect other contractual 
features: 
Contract_Feature  =       = 
 
γ0 + γ1USGAAP + γ2US_Lender + γ3USGAAP*US_Lender + ∑γiCountry-specific 
controls + ∑γiDebt-specific controls + ∑γiBorrower-specific controls + e 
(3) 
where Contract_Feature is replaced by loan spread, loan maturity, and the number of covenants 
included in the contract. I measure these variables at the loan package level as described in the 
Sample Selection section of the paper and in APPENDIX 3.1. The hypothesis predicts that when 
US lenders contract on US accounting standards, the loan will have lower interest rates, or γ3 < 0; 
longer maturities, or γ3 > 0; and require fewer financial covenants, or γ3 < 0. The remaining 
variables are defined similarly to Equations 1 and 2. 
3.4  Sample Selection and Results 
3.4.1  Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
To gather a sample of debt contracts, I begin with foreign firms cross-listed on US exchanges. 
Dealscan does not indicate which set of accounting standards is specified in a contract. Because 
cross-listing firms file lending agreements with the SEC, I am able to obtain a sample of contracts 
to observe the contract-specified accounting standards.38 
 I identify all firm years for which a cross-listing firm filed a form 20-F from 1994 to 2013 
then search 10-K Wizard for private debt agreements. I exclude contracts that do not specify the 
                                                 
38 Ball, Hail, and Vasvari (2013) find that the interest rate spreads on syndicated loans do not change following the 
decision to cross-list on an exchange in the United States, which suggests that the decision to cross-list on a US 
exchange alone does not materially affect the economic circumstances for private debt contracting, and therefore, 
the results should be generalizable. 
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set of accounting standards used for reporting financial information to the lender or for debt 
covenant calculations.3940 I manually collect loan data including the set of accounting standards 
used for financial covenants, loan date, amount, maturity, and the number and type of covenants. 
I exclude contracts that do not contain all data used in the empirical tests. I then merge in firm-
level financial information from Compustat as of the most recently completed fiscal year prior to 
the contract date using the SEC’s CIK identifier. Many contracts contain both term loans and 
revolving lines of credit. I find that accounting standards specified and debt covenants defined in 
the sample of private lending agreements do not vary among loan facilities within the same loan 
package. Hence, the analyses are conducted at the package level. For loan features such as interest 
rates and maturities that are set at the facility level, I aggregate these variables at the package level 
(see APPENDIX 3.1 variable definitions for details of the aggregation procedure). The sample 
selection criteria yield a final sample of 215 contracts. 
 Turning to descriptive statistics of the sample, Table 1 displays distributions of GAAP 
required in the sample contracts, contracts by year, and borrower and lender countries. Panel A 
provides important descriptive evidence—in the sample of debt contracts, US accounting 
standards are specified in only 14 percent of the sample contracts. Local GAAP occurs far more 
frequently with 58 percent of contracts requiring non-US and non-IFRS accounting standards. 
Contracts specify IFRS in 19 percent of contracts, Mexican GAAP in 14 percent of contracts, and 
                                                 
39 For each contract I obtain from the 10-K Wizard search, I search within the contract for “GAAP,” “generally,” 
“accounting,” “principle,” “IFRS,” and “standard.” Using these search terms, I identify approximately 200 contracts 
as having no mention of GAAP. Based on keyword searches, the excluded contracts are mainly amendments which 
typically articulate only those aspects of an agreement that contracting parties renegotiate, which is consistent with 
these contracts not mentioning accounting standards used. Identifying the accounting standards used would require 
an in-depth search to obtain the original lending agreements, if available, from SEC filings. 
40 Excluding contracts with no mention of accounting principles may induce bias into the sample. Certain borrowers, 
lenders, or time periods may be underrepresented. The excluded contracts fall in the latter portion of the sample 
period with excluded contracts concentrating in 2009, 2010, and 2013 potentially underrepresenting the latter 
portion of the sample period.  
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UK GAAP in approximately 14 percent of contracts. Approximately nine percent of the sample 
contracts give borrowers flexibility to report financial information according to more than one set 
of accounting standards, typically local GAAP or international standards (either IAS or IFRS 
depending on the contract date). In addition, Panel A shows the prominence of US GAAP, UK 
GAAP, Canadian GAAP, Mexican GAAP, and IFRS in the sample as required in the lending 
agreements, as reported by cross-listed borrowers, and as required in lenders’ country of domicile. 
Panel B indicates that 80 percent of the sample contracts occurred between 2002 and 2009. 
Consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 for EU firms, Panel B indicates a distinct trend 
in local GAAP versus IFRS requirements. The histograms in Figure 1: Panels A and B (graphing 
the data from Table 1: Panel B) illustrate lenders’ heavy use of local GAAP leading up to 
mandatory IFRS adoption as well as lenders’ shift to IFRS after the mandate. Overall, these 
descriptive findings emphasize the variety of accounting rules specified in debt agreements. Table 
1 Panel C indicates the variation in borrower and lender countries with the largest proportion of 
borrowers in the sample coming from Mexico (20 percent), Canada (20 percent), and the UK (17 
percent) and the largest proportion of lenders being domiciled in the UK (31 percent), the US (18 
percent), and Canada (16 percent). 
 Table 2 Panel A displays summary statistics for the sample. Of the available lending 
agreements in the sample, only 14 percent contract on US GAAP while 58 percent of contracts 
require local GAAP and 19 percent require IFRS. Additionally, US lenders account for only 19 
percent of contracts in the sample. While the sample firms are cross-listed on US equity markets, 
they appear to access foreign capital heavily. Maturities average approximately 49 months 
consistent with other samples of international lending agreements. Spreads average 300 basis 
points, which is higher than other studies but is not surprising given the nature of the firms in the 
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sample where the average return on assets is negative seven percent and 38 percent of borrowers 
experienced losses in the year prior to contract initiation. The sample exhibits large variation in 
borrower size and loan amounts with total assets of borrowers ranging from under $1 million up 
to $459 billion and loan amounts ranging from $1 million up to $15 billion. The summary statistics 
also indicate that 60 percent of sample contracts are between a borrower and lender from the same 
country consistent with findings in the finance literature (Carey and Nini 2007). Lenders and 
borrowers transacting within the same country are likely to use the same set of accounting rules. 
As such, the research design could simply be capturing lenders and borrowers located in the same 
country.41 To account for this, I include a control for within-country lending, Samectry, as a right-
hand-side variable to provide additional support for the hypothesis that lender preference for home-
country accounting principles is driven by costs of information processing and acquisition rather 
than lenders selecting borrowers based on geographical distance.42 In addition, I note from the 
sample collection efforts that some sample firms voluntarily provide full financial statements 
according to US GAAP. While these instances occur infrequently in the sample (10 percent of 
sample contracts), I include an indicator variable in the regression analyses to control for firms 
that voluntarily supply US GAAP financial statements.  
 Table 2 Panel B displays spearman correlations for the variables used in regression 
analyses. Consistent with H1, USGAAP and US_Lender are positively correlated significant at 
                                                 
41 The research design does not account for selection bias where lenders may be screening out potential borrowers 
that report accounting principles different from the lender’s home country. To the extent that lenders choose 
borrowers based on borrower-reported GAAP, the tests may have limited generalizability. 
42 Some countries allow financial reporting according to either local GAAP or international standards (e.g., as of 
2010 Japan permits IFRS reporting on a voluntary basis but does not mandate IFRS). Hence, borrowers may report 
international standards while lenders in the same country may initiate the bulk of loans in local GAAP. In 
untabulated statistics, I identify 31 contracts where borrower and lender are in the same country and the contract 
specifies GAAP that is different from lender-country GAAP. The results of the tests do not change when I rerun the 
tests using an alternative definition for Samectry where the indicator variable equals one when borrower and lender 
are domiciled in the same country and the required GAAP is the same as the lender-country GAAP.  
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the five-percent level (untabulated). The univariate statistics do not indicate strong correlations 
among USGAAP and hypothesized loan characteristics including spread, maturity, and the 
number of financial covenants. The correlations provide initial evidence that choosing US GAAP 
does have a strong effect on other loan terms. 
3.4.2  Results 
Table 3 presents probit model results estimating Equation 1. I present results of three 
specifications beginning with only the variable of interest, US_Lender, then estimating the model 
with additional control variables. Across all three specifications, US_Lender is positive and 
significant indicating that when US banks loan to cross-listed borrowers, the contracts are 
significantly more likely to specify US GAAP than local GAAP or IFRS. In particular, regardless 
of whether the lender and borrower are domiciled in the same country or whether the borrower 
voluntarily chooses to report US GAAP, US lenders continue to exhibit a strong preference for 
writing financial covenants based on US GAAP.  
The next analysis includes variables with proxies of accounting standard similarity 
following Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008). I compute country-pair accounting rule differences using 
the cross-listed firm country of operations (as opposed to the borrower level where the borrower 
is oftentimes a subsidiary of the cross-listed firm). Including the Btw variable and its interaction 
Btw_USLender, I estimate how variation in accounting standard differences affects US lender 
preference for US GAAP. Table 4 presents probit model coefficient estimates using robust 
standard errors. As in Table 3, I report three specifications beginning with a baseline model, then 
adding additional explanatory variables. First, I document a positive and significant coefficient on 
the Btw variable indicating that when country-pair accounting standards diverge, contracts are 
more likely to specify US GAAP on average. Next, I document a negative coefficient on 
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Btw_USLender. This coefficient is not statistically different from zero across specifications after 
controlling for country, loan, and borrower characteristics as well as for borrowers and lenders 
domiciled in the same country and borrowers who voluntarily report US GAAP. Hypothesis 2 
predicts that larger differences in accounting standards are associated with a lower probability of 
US lenders contracting on US GAAP. The lack of findings suggest that information acquisition 
and processing costs are offset by borrower-borne costs of producing a second set of financial 
statements. In other words, while the lender avoids the effort of learnings a second set of GAAP, 
the contracting parties are worse off because the borrower incurs incrementally more cost to 
produce financial statements in response to lenders’ demand for financial information. Hence, 
borrowers and lenders minimize overall contracting costs by writing debt covenants based on 
borrower GAAP rather than lender-country GAAP.  
Table 5 presents results related to H3 regarding the effects of lender preference for 
accounting principles on other contract terms. The table presents specifications with loan spreads, 
debt maturity, and the log of the number of financial covenants included in the contract serving as 
the dependent variables.  The first three columns regress loan spread on an indicator for contracts 
requiring US GAAP, an indicator for US lenders, and the interaction. The hypothesis predicts that 
lenders will offer lower interest rates to borrowers when contracting on lenders’ home-country 
accounting principles. The first two specifications show a positive and significant coefficient for 
USGAAP*US_Lender indicating that when US lenders contract on US GAAP, loan spreads are 
higher on average while non-US lenders contracting on US GAAP require lower interest rates. 
After controlling for same-country loans and voluntary US GAAP borrowers, the coefficients are 
no longer significant at conventional levels. The results for non-US lenders could indicate that they 
perceive US GAAP to be of sufficiently higher quality than local GAAP to warrant lower interest 
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rates on loans. The findings for US lenders is counterintuitive but could indicate that the borrowers 
systematically have higher risk. While somewhat surprising, the results are consistent with Carey 
and Nini (2007) who document that US lenders consistently charge higher spreads on syndicated 
loans to foreign borrowers than European lenders over a sample period from 1992 to 2002. 
The remaining columns of Table 5 display results from estimating Equation 3 relating to debt 
maturity and covenant use. The middle three columns of Table 5 present coefficient estimates of 
loan maturity on USGAAP*US_Lender show mixed results though none of the coefficients is 
statistically different from zero. There appears to be no clear directional effect of contract-
specified accounting standards and debt maturity. The final three columns on the right provide 
results of estimating Equation 3 with Log_cov as the dependent variable equal to the log of one 
plus the number of financial covenants contained in the sample debt contracts. Coefficients on 
USGAAP*US_Lender are negative across specifications consistent with the prediction although 
the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, the 
results of Table 5 do not provide convincing evidence to suggest that lender preference for 
accounting principles has an economically significant impact on other aspects of loan contracts. 
3.4.3  Supplemental Analysis 
The results in Table 3 indicate a positive and significant relation between US lenders and 
contracts specifying US accounting principles. To ensure that this finding is not isolated to US 
lenders, I investigate whether a similar relation holds for lenders of other countries. As Table 1 
Panel C indicates, while there is a great degree of variation in lender countries, the largest 
proportion of non-US lenders are domiciled in the UK and Canada. I augment Equation 1 changing 
the dependent variable and lender country indicators where the dependent variable is now equal to 
one for Canadian or UK GAAP respectively and zero otherwise and the main right-hand-side 
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variable of interest is an indicator equal to one if the lender is domiciled in Canada or the UK 
respectively. In addition to these two specifications, I include a third specification based on 
whether the lender is domiciled in a country that mandates IFRS for financial reporting. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if the contract requires IFRS and zero otherwise. The right-
hand-side variable is an indicator equal to one if the lender is domiciled in an IFRS-reporting 
country and zero otherwise. 
Table 6 reports coefficient estimates of probit regressions of Equation 1 augmented as 
described above. These tests show a positive and significant coefficient for each of the lender 
indicator variables for Canadian, UK, and IFRS-reporting lenders after controlling for country, 
loan, and borrower characteristics. These findings underscore the results of Table 3 suggesting that 
lenders across countries face similar costs of contracting due to GAAP differences.43  
The analysis of H2 as reported in Table 4 uses Btw as a proxy for accounting-standard 
differences between borrower and lender countries. I employ two modifications in untabulated 
analyses to test the sensitivity of the results to the choice of proxy for accounting-standard 
difference. First, as noted in Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008), the Btw measure is based on 
accounting standards in place as of 2001. Given the extent of convergence of accounting 
standards internationally including the EU mandated IFRS adoption in 2005, I estimate the 
model using observations prior to 2005. US GAAP occurs in only six contracts prior to 2005. To 
                                                 
43 In untabulated analyses, I document that the results for Canadian, UK, and IFRS-country lenders also hold after 
controlling for borrowers and lenders domiciled in the same country. In additional untabulated results, I note a 
similar positive and significant coefficient for Mexican lenders. In tests with French lenders, regressions of French 
GAAP on a French lender indicator alone yield similar results. When including control variables as in the 
specifications for Canadian, UK, and Mexican lenders, BigN and Collat were perfect predictors. After running a 
reduced model excluding these two covariates, the model perfectly predicts the dependent variable. These 
diagnostics indicate that there is insufficient variation in the control variables among contracts requiring French 
GAAP to estimate the augmented model based on Equation 1. However, running the model excluding indicator 
variables (e.g., PP and Loss) estimates the model and yields a positive and significant coefficient for the French 
lender indicator consistent with the findings for the other countries tabulated in Tables 3 and 6.  
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estimate this specification, I use ordinary least squares regressions with bootstrapped standard 
errors (based on 400 replications). The results using this alternative sample and estimation 
technique yield similar findings to Table 4. I also proxy for accounting-standard differences 
using 20-F reconciliation data where I replace the Btw measure in Equation 2 with levels and 
changes of reconciliation differences between home-country and US GAAP (scaled by total 
assets). Because the SEC eliminated the requirement for IFRS-reporting cross-listed firms to 
reconcile to US GAAP, I restrict the sample to years prior to the SEC elimination in 2007. This 
restriction reduces the sample to 121 observations. Using a baseline model without control 
variables, I find no statistically significant differences on the interaction of reconciliation 
differences and US lenders. 
3.5  Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to examine how accounting standard differences across countries are 
correlated with lender contracting costs. I examine the relation between contract-specified GAAP 
and lender-country GAAP and how this relation is affected by differences in borrower-reported 
GAAP and lender-country GAAP. Observing lenders’ contracting behavior provides an indication 
of the underlying costs of contracting. I argue that, similar to equity investors (Bradshaw, Bushee, 
and Miller 2004), private lenders use accounting information to acquire and process information 
in the contracting process and that accounting standard differences give rise to translation costs 
that lenders must account for when evaluating potential borrowers and setting contract terms. 
Consistent with this notion, I find that debt contracts are significantly more likely to specify US 
GAAP when underwritten by a US lender. I examine this relation more broadly and find consistent 
results for Canadian lenders, UK lenders, and IFRS-country lenders suggesting that accounting 
standard differences are costly to lenders and result in a lender preference for accounting standards 
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that match those prevalent in its home country. In the next set of tests, I find statistically significant 
evidence that US lenders are more likely to contract on US GAAP when accounting-rule 
differences are large. I also investigate the extent to which lender preferences for accounting 
standards affect how lenders set other loan terms including spread, maturity, and covenant use but 
find no evidence to conclude that contract-specified accounting standards significantly affect other 
loan terms.  
 This study is not without limitations. While I document a significant positive relation 
between US lenders and the probability that the private debt contract specifies the use of US 
GAAP, the finding could be interpreted in two ways. First, the results are consistent with lenders 
selecting borrowers that are already reporting US GAAP. Second, the results are consistent with 
US lenders requiring US GAAP to avoid translation costs in the presence of accounting standard 
differences. Neither the data nor the statistical design are sufficient to differentiate between these 
two explanations. Additionally, I employ multiple criteria to select the sample to make data 
collection more feasible. The sample selection criteria may induce bias into the sample that may 
exclude lending agreements, borrowers, or lenders that differ systematically from the population 
of interest. To the extent that the sample is biased, the generalizability of the findings may be 
limited. 
 This paper contributes to extant research in two ways. First, my study is most closely 
related to literature investigating how differences in accounting rules affect equity investors’ 
information acquisition and processing costs (see, e.g., Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller (2004), 
Covrig, Defond, and Hung (2007), DeFond, Hu, Hung, and Li (2011)). The findings in the 
literature support the view that greater conformity to US accounting standards, voluntary IAS 
adoption, and mandatory IFRS adoption decrease investors’ information acquisition and 
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processing costs. My paper provides evidence from debt investors consistent with this view. I find 
a significant relation between US-domiciled lenders and the likelihood that contracts specify US 
GAAP, and this relation carries over to Canada, UK, and IFRS-reporting countries. These findings 
suggest that cross-country accounting standard differences affect lenders’ contracting costs and 
result in lenders exhibiting a preference for contracting on accounting standards from their country 
of domicile. 
 Second, this study relates to prior work investigating how changes in international 
accounting standards affect credit ratings and the structure of private debt agreements (see, e.g., 
Florou, Kosi, and Pope (2012), Florou and Kosi (2013), Chen, Chin, Wang, Yao (2012)). I 
contribute to these studies by providing novel evidence of contract-specified accounting 
standards from a sample of hand-collected debt agreements, and the findings suggest that the 
contracted standards reveal lenders’ preference for home-country accounting standards for 
contracting purposes. 
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Appendix 3.1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
USGAAP Indicator variable equal to 1 if lending contract 
requires U.S. GAAP and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collection 
Localgaap Indicator variable equal to 1 if lending contract 
requires home-country GAAP and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collection 
IFRS Indicator variable equal to 1 if lending contract 
requires IFRS and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collection 
US_Lender Indicator variable equal to 1 if the lender office listed 
in the loan contract is domiciled in the U.S. and 0 
otherwise. 
Hand collection 
Btw Equals the sum of country-pair sum differences 
between domestic accounting standards of cross-listed 
firm and International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
based on Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008). 
Bae, Tan, and 
Welker (2008) 
RuleLaw Equals the country-specific time-series mean of the 
rule of law index from Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi 
(2007) based on cross-listed firm. 
Kaufmann, Kraay, 
Mastruzzi (2007)  
BigN Indicator variable equal to 1 if the cross-listed firm is 
audited by a Big-N auditor in the year prior to the 
contract start date and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Loansize Equals the log of package-level loan amount in U.S. 
Dollars. 
Hand collection 
Spread Equals the package-level interest rate. I compute this 
variable in two steps. First, at the facility level, I sum 
the stated interest rate margins and applicable 
benchmark rates such as LIBOR or Prime rate 
(excluding fees such as revolving credit commitment 
fees) then subtract off the LIBOR rate to calculate the 
spread. If a facility specifies multiple borrowing types 
such as LIBOR loans and Prime loans, I average the 
spread within the facility. Second, I calculate a 
weighted average spread at the package level using 
the US Dollar facility amount. 
Hand collection 
Maturity Equals loan maturity (in months). I compute this 
variable as the median value of facility-level 
maturities within a package. 
Hand collection 
Log_cov Equals the log of one plus the number of financial 
covenants in the contract. 
Hand collection 
Revolv Indicator variable equal to 1 if the package contains a 
revolving credit facility and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collection 
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Variable Definition Data Source 
PP Indicator variable equal to 1 if the package contains 
a performance-pricing provision and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collection 
Collat Indicator variable equal to 1 if the package requires 
collateral and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collection 
Covenant Indicator variable equal to 1 if the package contains 
financial covenants and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collection 
Size Equals the log of borrower total assets in the year 
prior to the contract start date. 
Compustat 
Leverage Equals total liabilities (LT) divided by total assets 
(AT) in the year prior to the contract start date. 
Compustat 
ROA Equals earnings before extraordinary items (IB) 
divided by total assets (AT) in the year prior to the 
contract start date. 
Compustat 
Tangibility Equals net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) 
divided by total assets (AT) in the year prior to the 
contract start date. 
Compustat 
Loss Indicator variable equal to 1 if borrower net income 
is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Samectry Indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower and 
lender are domiciled in the same country and 0 
otherwise. I identify borrower country using the 'loc' 
code in Compustat indicating the country of the 
firm's primary operations. I identify lender country 
based on lender contact information provided in the 
sample lending agreements. 
Hand collection and 
Compustat 
USVoluntary Indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower 
voluntarily reports financial statements according to 
US GAAP and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collection 
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Figure 3.1: Temporal Distribution of Contract-Specified GAAP 
Panel A: Histogram of Contracts Specifying US GAAP, IFRS, and Local GAAP Across 
Sample Years 
Figure 3.1: Temporal Distribution of Contract-Specified GAAP. Panel A presents a combined histogram of 
accounting standards specified in debt contracts over the sample period with contracts available from 1997 to 
2013. The y-axis measures the number of contracts specifying a particular set of accounting standards in each 
year of the sample period and the x-axis indicates the contract year. This figure displays contracts requiring US 
GAAP (blue, top), IFRS (red, middle), and Local GAAP or domestic GAAP (green, bottom). 
     
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
0
10
20
30
40
#
 C
o
n
tr
a
ct
s
Year
Time Distribution of Required GAAP in Debt 
Contracts of Cross-Listed Borrowers
USGAAP
IFRS
LOCAL
GAAP
[98] 
 
Panel B: Separate Histograms of US GAAP, IFRS, and Local GAAP Across Years 
Figure 3.1: Temporal Distribution of Contract-Specified GAAP.  Panel B presents separate histograms of 
contract-specified accounting standards for US GAAP (blue), IFRS (red), and Local GAAP (green) for the 
sample contracts. The y-axis measures the number of contracts and the x-axis indicates the contract year.  
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Table 3.1 
Distributions of Contract-Specified GAAP, Loan Contracts by Year, and Borrower and Lender Countries 
Panel A: Distribution of GAAP Specified in Debt Contracts     
  Required % Lender % Borrower % 
Argentine 2 0.9% 1 0.5% 3 1.4% 
Austrian     1 0.5%     
Belgian         1 0.5% 
Brazilian 2 0.9%     2 0.9% 
Canadian 26 12.1% 33 15.3% 26 12.2% 
Chilean 2 0.9% 1 0.5% 2 0.9% 
Chinese 4 1.9% 6 2.8%     
Flexible 20 9.3%         
French 16 7.4% 16 7.4% 20 9.4% 
German     1 0.5%     
Hong Kong         2 0.9% 
IFRS 40 18.6% 45 20.9% 30 14.1% 
Indonesian 8 3.7% 7 3.3% 8 3.8% 
Israeli 1 0.5%     1 0.5% 
Japanese     1 0.5%     
Mexican 31 14.4% 16 7.4% 40 18.8% 
Netherland 2 0.9%     3 1.4% 
Netherland     2 0.9% 2 0.9% 
South African 1 0.5% 1 0.5% 5 2.3% 
Singapore     1 0.5%     
Spanish     1 0.5%     
Swedish 1 0.5%     3 1.4% 
UK 29 13.5% 44 20.5% 31 14.6% 
US 30 14.0% 38 17.7% 34 16.0% 
Total 215 100.0% 215 100.0% 213 100.0% 
              
Table 3.1 presents sample distributions of contract-specified accounting standards, 
frequency of contracts and contract-specified GAAP across time, and borrower and lender 
countries.  Panel A displays the distribution of accounting standards. The first column 
displays GAAP specified in debt contracts, the second column displays GAAP required in 
the country where the lending office is domiciled, and the third column displays GAAP 
reported by the cross-listed borrower per the 20-F filing (or 10-K filing for voluntary US 
GAAP adopters). The “Flexible” designation refers to contracts in which the lender is 
indifferent between two sets of accounting standards such as French GAAP or IFRS.  Three 
cross-listed firms reported financial information based on Argentine Banking GAAP and are 
labeled as 'Argentine GAAP'. One borrower reported financial statements based on Brazilian 
Corporate Law Accounting and is labeled as 'Brazilian GAAP'. Missing data limit the 
borrower-reported GAAP (column 3) to 213 observations. 
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Panel B: Distribution of Loan Contracts and Contract-Specified GAAP by Year 
Year # Contracts % Contracts USGAAP IFRS LOCALGAAP FLEXIBLE 
1997 1 0.5% 0 0 1 0 
1999 5 2.3% 0 1 4 0 
2000 6 2.8% 0 0 6 0 
2001 8 3.7% 0 1 7 0 
2002 16 7.4% 0 1 14 1 
2003 35 16.3% 1 1 29 4 
2004 35 16.3% 5 6 22 2 
2005 22 10.2% 5 6 11 0 
2006 20 9.3% 7 5 6 2 
2007 21 9.8% 2 6 7 6 
2008 12 5.6% 5 1 5 1 
2009 11 5.1% 0 2 9 0 
2010 6 2.8% 1 3 1 1 
2011 9 4.2% 2 4 1 2 
2012 6 2.8% 0 3 2 1 
2013 2 0.9% 2 0 0 0 
Total 215 100.0% 30 40 125 20 
              
Table 3.1 presents sample distributions of contract-specified accounting standards, frequency 
of contracts and contract-specified GAAP across time, and borrower and lender countries. 
Panel B displays the distribution of contracts across time and shows how contract-specified 
GAAP in the sample contracts is distributed over time where US GAAP, IFRS, and 
LOCALGAAP are defined in APPENDIX 3.1.  
  
[101] 
 
Panel C: Distribution of Borrower and Lender Countries     
Country 
Borrower 
Country % Lender Country %     
Argentina 3 1.4% 1 0.5%     
Austria 1 0.5% 2 0.9%     
Belgium 2 0.9% 0 0.0%     
Brazil 3 1.4% 0 0.0%     
Canada 43 20.0% 35 16.3%     
Chile 2 0.9% 1 0.5%     
China 6 2.8% 6 2.8%     
France 24 11.2% 22 10.2%     
Germany 0 0.0% 3 1.4%     
Greece 1 0.5% 5 2.3%     
Hong Kong 2 0.9% 0 0.0%     
Indonesia 8 3.7% 7 3.3%     
Ireland 4 1.9% 2 0.9%     
Israel 1 0.5% 0 0.0%     
Japan 0 0.0% 1 0.5%     
Luxembourg 5 2.3% 0 0.0%     
Mexico 43 20.0% 16 7.4%     
Norway 2 0.9% 3 1.4%     
Singapore 0 0.0% 1 0.5%     
South Africa 9 4.2% 2 0.9%     
Spain 0 0.0% 1 0.5%     
Sweden 4 1.9% 1 0.5%     
Switzerland 2 0.9% 0 0.0%     
The Netherlands 13 6.0% 2 0.9%     
United Kingdom 37 17.2% 66 30.7%     
USA 0 0.0% 38 17.7%     
Total 215 100.0% 215 100.0%     
              
Table 3.1 presents sample distributions of contract-specified accounting standards, frequency 
of contracts and contract-specified GAAP across time, and borrower and lender countries. 
Finally, Panel C provides a country distribution displaying the frequency of borrower countries 
using the cross-listed firm country of domicile from Compustat ('loc') and the frequency of 
lender countries using the address of the lending office listed in the loan contract. 
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TABLE 3.2 
Sample Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
                      
  Variable   N Mean Std Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
  USGAAP   215 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  LOCALGAAP 215 0.58 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  IFRS   215 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Flexible   215 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  US_Lender   215 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Spread   215 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.16 
  Maturity (in months) 215 48.68 31.01 3.00 24.00 48.00 60.00 161.00 
  #Covenants   215 1.66 1.26 0.00 0.00 2.00 3.00 6.00 
  RuleLaw   215 0.99 1.00 -0.81 -0.39 1.74 1.78 1.98 
  BigN   215                0.88                 0.33  0.00                1.00                 1.00                 1.00                 1.00  
  Deal_Amount 215 1,183.66 2,579.86 1.00 55.00 288.83 1,000.00 15,105.60 
  Revolv   215 0.59 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  PP   215 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Collat   215 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  Covenant   215 0.75 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Total Assets   215 24,722.58 66,799.82 0.29 678.69 3,356.49 16,015.78 458,709.44 
  Leverage   215 0.68 0.36 0.09 0.47 0.62 0.79 2.42 
  ROA   215 -0.08 0.46 -3.40 -0.06 0.02 0.06 0.28 
  Tangibility   215 0.40 0.26 0.00 0.15 0.43 0.62 0.94 
  Loss   215 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
  Samectry   215 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  USVoluntary   215 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
                      
 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics and correlations for the sample of cross-listed foreign firm debt contracts used in the regression analyses. Panel A 
presents summary statistics and Panel B presents Spearman correlations. *Significant at the one-percent level. See APPENDIX 3.1 for variable definitions. 
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Panel B: Spearman Correlations                               
                                          
      (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) USGAAP 0.15 -0.03 0.12 0.15 0.21* 0.11 -0.12 0.01 0.11 0.24* 0.05 -0.14 0.07 0.08 0.07 -0.15 -0.11 0.63* 
(2) US_Lender 0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.14 -0.04 -0.07 -0.21* 0.07 0.17 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.05 -0.15 -0.32* 0.09 
(3) Spread       -0.02 0.00 -0.12 -0.21* -0.53* -0.37* -0.25* 0.25* -0.10 -0.38* 0.09 -0.48* -0.05 0.41* 0.16 -0.02 
(4) Maturity (in months)   0.13 0.11 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.13 0.14 0.07 -0.12 0.12 0.09 0.12 -0.12 -0.09 0.13 
(5) Log_cov           -0.14 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.23* 0.03 0.77* 0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 
(6) RuleLaw             0.25* 0.01 0.21* 0.14 0.29* -0.09 -0.26* -0.06 -0.04 -0.17 0.08 0.00 0.32* 
(7) BigN               0.19* 0.07 0.15 0.01 0.18* 0.16 -0.05 0.03 -0.12 0.11 -0.07 0.08 
(8) Loansize                 0.43* 0.41* -0.20* 0.28* 0.72* -0.02 0.19* -0.10 -0.18* -0.03 -0.24* 
(9) Revolv                   0.36* -0.18* 0.17 0.26* 0.06 0.21* -0.26* -0.19* 0.18* -0.03 
(10) PP                     -0.06 0.28* 0.15 -0.16 0.08 -0.04 -0.11 -0.05 0.01 
(11) Collat                       0.03 -0.30* 0.06 -0.14 0.04 0.16 -0.07 0.14 
(12) Covenant                       0.26* 0.02 0.00 -0.13 -0.04 0.04 -0.13 
(13) Size                           0.10 0.06 -0.16 -0.09 0.04 -0.40* 
(14) Leverage                             -0.22* 0.20* 0.15 0.01 0.03 
(15) ROA                               0.15 -0.84* -0.13 0.17 
(16) Tangibility                             -0.13 -0.28* 0.06 
(17) Loss                                   0.16 -0.13 
(18) Samectry                                     -0.20* 
(19) USVoluntary                                   
                                          
                                          
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics and correlations for the sample of cross-listed foreign firm debt contracts used in the regression analyses. Panel A presents 
summary statistics and Panel B presents Spearman correlations. *Significant at the one-percent level. See APPENDIX 3.1 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3.3 
Probit Regressions of US GAAP on US Lender 
          
Variable Pred USGAAP USGAAP USGAAP 
          
US_Lender (+) 0.5296** 0.6746** 1.2592** 
    [2.12] [2.38] [2.46] 
          
RuleLaw     0.2673* 0.037 
      [1.72] [0.17] 
          
BigN     0.9769** 0.5116 
      [2.14] [1.08] 
          
Loansize     -0.2445** -0.5392*** 
      [-2.36] [-3.22] 
          
Spread     0.0087 -0.2075 
      [0.04] [-0.73] 
          
Maturity     0.0414 0.2925 
      [0.21] [1.08] 
          
Revolv     0.1702 0.7745* 
      [0.58] [1.92] 
          
PP     0.5630* 0.9835** 
      [1.70] [2.03] 
          
Collat     0.8187*** 1.7118*** 
      [2.94] [3.12] 
          
Covenant     0.1226 0.3427 
      [0.40] [0.80] 
          
Size     0.0592 0.7630*** 
      [0.64] [4.04] 
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Variable   USGAAP USGAAP USGAAP 
          
Leverage     0.7615 0.1325 
      [1.40] [0.29] 
          
ROA     1.5568 -1.2309** 
      [0.94] [-2.09] 
          
Tangibility     1.4310** 3.4252*** 
      [2.50] [3.82] 
          
Loss     -0.5438 -1.1486** 
      [-1.43] [-2.42] 
          
Samectry       0.7682* 
        [1.71] 
          
USVoluntary       4.8646*** 
        [5.38] 
          
Constant   -1.2040*** -3.4931** -11.2098*** 
    [-9.65] [-2.51] [-4.67] 
          
          
N   215 215 215 
Pseudo R-Squared   2.53% 25.17% 65.32% 
          
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in 
parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
          
Table 3.3 presents coefficient estimates from a probit model estimating Equation (1) for the 
sample of debt contracts from cross-listed borrowers. The dependent variable is an indicator 
equal to one if lenders require US GAAP for financial covenant compliance and zero 
otherwise. The main variable of interest, US_Lender, is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the lender of a sample contract is domiciled in the US and zero otherwise. See APPENDIX 3.1 
for detailed definitions of the remaining variables. 
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TABLE 3.4 
Analysis of Accounting-Rule Differences 
          
Variable Pred USGAAP USGAAP USGAAP 
          
Btw   0.0911*** 0.1140*** 0.2089*** 
    [3.75] [3.95] [2.69] 
          
US_Lender   0.8262* 1.0932** 4.0384** 
    [1.81] [2.12] [2.55] 
          
Btw*US_Lender (+) -0.0802 -0.0987 -0.3594 
    [-1.13] [-1.23] [-1.63] 
          
RuleLaw     0.3216* 0.2781 
      [1.82] [1.06] 
          
BigN     1.0048* 1.2069 
      [1.90] [1.48] 
          
Loansize     -0.2972*** -0.7091*** 
      [-2.62] [-3.00] 
          
Spread     0.1538 -0.3292 
      [0.52] [-0.61] 
          
Maturity     0.0287 0.4177* 
      [0.15] [1.72] 
          
Revolv     0.2650 1.0743* 
      [0.84] [1.80] 
          
PP     0.5813* 1.7319** 
      [1.73] [2.44] 
          
Collat     0.9481*** 2.7336*** 
      [3.35] [2.80] 
          
Covenant     0.5363 0.7748 
      [1.48] [1.57] 
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Variable   USGAAP USGAAP USGAAP 
          
Size     0.1101 1.1211*** 
      [1.13] [3.86] 
          
Leverage     0.6082 0.0300 
      [1.19] [0.05] 
          
ROA     1.1200 -1.8979** 
      [0.90] [-2.34] 
          
Tangibility     1.6864*** 5.6508*** 
      [2.86] [3.84] 
          
Loss     -0.5208 -1.2489** 
      [-1.45] [-2.12] 
          
Samectry       1.7975** 
        [2.13] 
          
USVoluntary       6.3656*** 
        [4.05] 
          
Constant   -1.5604*** -4.7943*** -19.0679*** 
    [-9.58] [-3.25] [-4.11] 
          
          
N   215 215 215 
Pseudo R-Squared   9.89% 31.55% 69.74% 
          
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in 
parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          
Table 3.4 presents coefficient estimates from a probit model estimating Equation (2) for the sample of debt 
contracts from cross-listed borrowers. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if lenders require US 
GAAP for financial covenant compliance and zero otherwise. The main variable of interest, Btw*US_Lender, is 
the interaction of Btw, a measure of differences in accounting principles based on Bae et al. (2008), and 
US_Lender, and indicator variable equal to one if the lender of a sample contract is domiciled in the US and zero 
otherwise. See APPENDIX 3.1 for detailed definitions of the remaining variables. 
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TABLE 3.5 
Analysis of the Effect of Lender Preference on Loan Terms 
                    
Variable Spread Spread Spread Maturity Maturity Maturity Log_cov Log_cov Log_cov 
                    
USGAAP -0.1869** -0.1151 -0.0404 0.2722 -0.0109 0.0849 0.2266 0.2200 0.4522*** 
  [-2.41] [-1.29] [-0.35] [1.33] [-0.05] [0.30] [1.56] [1.53] [2.74] 
                    
US_Lender 0.0808 -0.0314 0.0480 0.0274 -0.0713 -0.1384 0.0789 0.0011 0.0088 
  [0.71] [-0.31] [0.49] [0.18] [-0.48] [-0.89] [0.72] [0.01] [0.07] 
                    
USGAAP*US_Lender 0.4948** 0.4013** 0.2877 -0.0113 -0.0015 0.0731 -0.1247 -0.1468 -0.1817 
  [2.09] [1.98] [1.37] [-0.04] [-0.00] [0.23] [-0.62] [-0.74] [-0.90] 
                    
Spread         -0.0421 -0.0266   0.0555 0.0472 
          [-0.45] [-0.27]   [0.63] [0.54] 
                    
Maturity   -0.0187 -0.0117         0.0573 0.0508 
    [-0.44] [-0.27]         [1.19] [1.09] 
                    
Covenant   0.0357 0.0192   0.0363 0.0287       
    [0.33] [0.18]   [0.26] [0.21]       
                    
RuleLaw   
-
0.1156*** 
-
0.1186***   -0.0313 -0.0195   
-
0.1327*** -0.1210** 
    [-2.90] [-3.00]   [-0.45] [-0.28]   [-2.87] [-2.59] 
                    
BigN   -0.1717 -0.1400   -0.0556 -0.0707   0.1353 0.1450 
    [-1.00] [-0.84]   [-0.35] [-0.43]   [1.07] [1.14] 
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TABLE 3.5 (continued) 
Analysis of the Effect of Lender Preference on Loan Terms 
                    
Variable Spread Spread Spread Maturity Maturity Maturity Log_cov Log_cov Log_cov 
                    
Loansize   -0.0982*** -0.0880***   -0.0014 -0.0032   0.0328 0.0402 
    [-3.82] [-3.42]   [-0.03] [-0.06]   [1.10] [1.35] 
                    
Revolv   -0.0990 -0.1230   -0.0408 -0.0250   0.0141 -0.0000 
    [-1.09] [-1.36]   [-0.32] [-0.20]   [0.14] [-0.00] 
                    
PP   0.0477 0.0455   0.3468*** 0.3405***   0.2096** 0.1989** 
    [0.64] [0.61]   [2.85] [2.80]   [2.27] [2.15] 
                    
Collat   0.1953*** 0.1910**   0.2350* 0.2100   0.1067 0.0703 
    [2.64] [2.55]   [1.72] [1.51]   [1.03] [0.67] 
                    
Size   -0.0255 -0.0349   -0.0446 -0.0554   0.0103 -0.0196 
    [-1.17] [-1.40]   [-1.07] [-1.09]   [0.42] [-0.70] 
                    
Leverage   0.0108 0.0180   0.5813*** 0.5956***   0.0135 0.0491 
    [0.10] [0.18]   [3.28] [3.32]   [0.14] [0.53] 
                    
ROA   -0.2169** -0.2011*   0.8103*** 0.8601***   0.1780** 0.2696*** 
    [-2.20] [-1.86]   [4.54] [4.42]   [2.21] [2.96] 
                    
Tangibility   -0.2597* -0.2192   0.1711 0.1082   -0.2596* -0.2931* 
    [-1.75] [-1.45]   [0.65] [0.40]   [-1.69] [-1.80] 
                    
Loss   0.2870*** 0.2757***   -0.0677 -0.0577   0.0696 0.0742 
    [3.57] [3.34]   [-0.49] [-0.41]   [0.86] [0.93] 
[110] 
 
                    
Variable Spread Spread Spread Maturity Maturity Maturity Log_cov Log_cov Log_cov 
                    
Samectry     0.1625**     -0.1585     -0.0103 
      [1.98]     [-1.41]     [-0.12] 
                    
USVoluntary     -0.0537     -0.2032     -0.3606** 
      [-0.50]     [-0.73]     [-2.54] 
                    
Constant 1.2532*** 2.2743*** 2.1457*** 3.5905*** 3.5588*** 3.7810*** 0.8014*** 0.2501 0.5085 
  [21.54] [8.36] [7.33] [52.82] [9.21] [8.23] [18.09] [0.75] [1.38] 
                    
                    
N 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
Adjusted R-
Squared 1.10% 42.93% 43.61% -0.05% 14.56% 14.59% 0.44% 11.73% 13.39% 
                    
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
                    
Table 3.5 presents results of estimating Equation (3) for the sample of debt contracts from cross-listed borrowers. The dependent 
variables noted at the top of each column are measures of loan spreads (natural log of loan spread as defined in APPENDIX 3.1), loan 
maturities (natural log of loan maturity in months as defined in APPENDIX 3.1), and the number of covenants (natural log of the 
number of financial covenants). The primary variable of interest is the interaction of USGAAP*US_Lender where USGAAP is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a contract requires US GAAP and US_Lender is an indicator variable equal to one if a contract is 
from a US-domiciled bank. See APPENDIX 3.1 for detailed definitions of the remaining variables. 
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TABLE 3.6 
Supplemental Analysis of Lender Preference: Canadian, UK, and IFRS Lenders 
            
Variable 
Canadian 
GAAP   UK GAAP   IFRS 
            
Canadian_Lender 3.1288***         
  [6.27]         
            
UK_Lender     1.9710***     
      [5.32]     
            
IFRS_Lender         1.3114*** 
          [4.96] 
            
RuleLaw 0.7018**   1.4459***   0.1705 
  [2.34]   [4.44]   [1.37] 
            
BigN 0.1642   0.1416   -0.8071** 
  [0.21]   [0.21]   [-2.13] 
            
Loansize 0.2591   0.3352*   -0.0778 
  [1.55]   [1.82]   [-0.92] 
            
Spread 1.2601**   0.2459   -0.1886 
  [2.22]   [0.69]   [-0.90] 
            
Maturity 1.2941***   -0.0546   0.2565 
  [4.31]   [-0.25]   [1.62] 
            
Revolv 0.1187   0.0361   -0.3104 
  [0.19]   [0.06]   [-1.12] 
            
PP 0.2847   -0.5035   0.5466** 
  [0.52]   [-1.39]   [1.97] 
            
Collat -0.1605   -1.5301***   0.1054 
  [-0.44]   [-2.72]   [0.39] 
            
Covenant 0.0854   0.7856   0.0825 
  [0.16]   [1.57]   [0.26] 
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Variable 
Canadian 
GAAP   UK GAAP   IFRS 
            
Size -0.5135***   -0.3216**   0.1131* 
  [-4.03]   [-2.14]   [1.69] 
            
Leverage -0.0357   0.145   -0.6284 
  [-0.08]   [0.26]   [-1.39] 
            
ROA 0.5964   0.2905   0.7391 
  [1.45]   [0.40]   [0.65] 
            
Tangibility -1.7422**   -0.5596   0.2088 
  [-2.09]   [-0.79]   [0.41] 
            
Loss 0.5554   0.3489   -0.1968 
  [1.34]   [0.89]   [-0.56] 
            
Constant -7.8402***   -4.3042***   -1.7734 
  [-3.86]   [-3.03]   [-1.54] 
            
            
N 215   215   215 
Pseudo R-Squared 68.89%   54.53%   24.88% 
            
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
            
Table 3.6 presents results from supplementary analyses of contract-specified accounting 
standards and lender country. The table displays coefficient estimates from a probit model 
estimating Equation (1) for the sample of debt contracts from cross-listed borrowers. 
Adapting from Table 3, the dependent variables noted at the top of each column are indicator 
variables for Canadian GAAP, UK GAAP, and IFRS, respectively. The explanatory variables 
of interest are indicators for Canadian, UK, and IFRS-country lenders, respectively. See 
APPENDIX 3.1 for detailed definitions of the remaining variables. 
 
